CVE-2010-5156 in Internet Security Suite 2010
Summary
by MITRE
** DISPUTED ** Race condition in CA Internet Security Suite Plus 2010 6.0.0.272 on Windows XP allows local users to bypass kernel-mode hook handlers, and execute dangerous code that would otherwise be blocked by a handler but not blocked by signature-based malware detection, via certain user-space memory changes during hook-handler execution, aka an argument-switch attack or a KHOBE attack. NOTE: this issue is disputed by some third parties because it is a flaw in a protection mechanism for situations where a crafted program has already begun to execute.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/07/2024
The vulnerability described in CVE-2010-5156 represents a significant race condition within the kernel-mode hook handlers of CA Internet Security Suite Plus 2010 version 6.0.0.272 running on Windows XP systems. This flaw operates at the intersection of kernel security mechanisms and user-mode memory manipulation, creating a critical pathway for privilege escalation and code execution bypass. The issue manifests as a timing window during which kernel-mode security handlers are temporarily vulnerable to manipulation by local users, allowing them to circumvent protection mechanisms that would normally block malicious code execution.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability relies on a sophisticated attack pattern known as argument-switch or KHOBE (Kernel Hook Obfuscation and Exploitation) attacks that exploit the temporal gap between when hook handlers are invoked and when they complete their processing. During this brief window, attackers can modify user-space memory structures that are being referenced by kernel-mode handlers, effectively swapping legitimate arguments with malicious ones before the security checks are fully executed. This approach leverages the fundamental weakness of race conditions in kernel security implementations where temporal dependencies create exploitable gaps in protection mechanisms.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability presents a severe risk to systems running the affected security suite, as it allows local users to bypass kernel-mode protections that are specifically designed to prevent malicious code execution. The attack vector specifically targets the signature-based malware detection systems that rely on kernel hooks to intercept and analyze potentially dangerous operations. By exploiting this race condition, attackers can execute code that would normally be blocked by the hook handlers but remains undetected by traditional signature-based detection methods, creating a stealthy and effective bypass mechanism. The vulnerability's impact is particularly concerning because it undermines the core security assumptions of the protection framework.
The attack methodology involves carefully timing memory modifications to occur during the execution of kernel-mode hook handlers, where the system is temporarily in a state of reduced protection. This requires precise knowledge of the kernel's execution flow and the specific timing windows when handlers are most vulnerable. The technique aligns with ATT&CK framework's T1068 (Local Privilege Escalation) and T1059 (Command and Scripting Interpreter) tactics, as it enables attackers to escalate privileges and execute malicious code that would otherwise be blocked by the security suite's defensive mechanisms. This vulnerability demonstrates the critical importance of race condition mitigation in kernel security systems and highlights the challenges of maintaining secure temporal dependencies in protective frameworks.
Security mitigations for this vulnerability should focus on eliminating the race condition through proper synchronization mechanisms and ensuring that kernel-mode handlers complete their operations before allowing user-space modifications to affect their execution context. The solution involves implementing robust locking mechanisms and temporal barriers that prevent the manipulation of handler arguments during critical execution phases. Additionally, system administrators should consider disabling or upgrading the affected security suite components, as the vulnerability represents a fundamental flaw in the protection mechanism itself. The issue also underscores the necessity of comprehensive testing for temporal dependencies in security systems and adherence to secure coding practices that prevent race conditions in kernel-level code, aligning with CWE categories related to race conditions and improper synchronization in security-critical contexts.