CVE-2010-5161 in Internet Security 2010
Summary
by MITRE
** DISPUTED ** Race condition in F-Secure Internet Security 2010 10.00 build 246 on Windows XP allows local users to bypass kernel-mode hook handlers, and execute dangerous code that would otherwise be blocked by a handler but not blocked by signature-based malware detection, via certain user-space memory changes during hook-handler execution, aka an argument-switch attack or a KHOBE attack. NOTE: this issue is disputed by some third parties because it is a flaw in a protection mechanism for situations where a crafted program has already begun to execute.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/07/2024
The vulnerability described in CVE-2010-5161 represents a significant race condition within F-Secure Internet Security 2010 version 10.00 build 246 on Windows XP systems. This flaw exists within the kernel-mode hook handler mechanism that is designed to monitor and block malicious activities at the operating system level. The race condition occurs during the execution of kernel-mode hooks when user-space processes attempt to modify memory structures while the hook handlers are actively processing. This timing issue creates an exploitable window where malicious code can potentially bypass the protective mechanisms that should otherwise prevent dangerous operations from executing. The vulnerability is particularly concerning because it allows local users to circumvent kernel-mode protections that are specifically designed to intercept and block malicious activities before they can cause harm. According to the description, this represents what security researchers term an argument-switch attack or KHOBE attack, which specifically targets the timing dependencies in kernel-mode hook execution to exploit the window of vulnerability.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability leverages a race condition that occurs during the execution of kernel-mode hook handlers in the F-Secure security software. When the hook handler is processing a particular operation, a local user can manipulate user-space memory structures in such a way that the kernel-mode handler receives different arguments than originally intended. This argument switching effectively allows the malicious code to bypass the normal security checks that would normally prevent dangerous operations from executing. The underlying mechanism involves the timing between when the hook handler begins execution and when it completes processing, creating a temporal window where memory modifications can alter the execution flow or parameters of the security checks. This type of vulnerability falls under the category of race condition flaws, which are categorized as CWE-362 in the Common Weakness Enumeration system. The vulnerability demonstrates how improper synchronization between kernel and user-mode execution contexts can create security bypass opportunities.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple privilege escalation, as it fundamentally undermines the core protection mechanisms that security software relies upon to prevent malicious code execution. When successfully exploited, this vulnerability allows local attackers to execute dangerous code that would normally be blocked by the kernel-mode hook handlers but remains undetected by signature-based malware detection systems. This creates a dangerous situation where the security software's primary defense mechanisms are effectively neutralized, leaving systems vulnerable to attacks that could otherwise be prevented. The attack vector specifically targets the timing dependencies in kernel-mode operations, making it particularly difficult to detect and prevent. The vulnerability's impact is amplified by the fact that it operates at the kernel level, where it can bypass traditional user-mode security controls and potentially gain elevated privileges or access to system resources that would normally be protected.
Security mitigations for this vulnerability require addressing the fundamental race condition in the kernel-mode hook handler implementation. Organizations should ensure that all F-Secure Internet Security 2010 installations are updated to the latest available patches from the vendor, although the disputed nature of this vulnerability suggests that the vendor may have considered it a legitimate security issue. System administrators should implement additional monitoring to detect anomalous memory access patterns that could indicate exploitation attempts, particularly around kernel-mode hook execution contexts. The vulnerability highlights the importance of proper synchronization mechanisms in kernel-mode code and demonstrates the need for comprehensive testing of timing-dependent security features. Security professionals should consider implementing behavioral monitoring solutions that can detect the specific patterns associated with argument-switch attacks and KHOBE exploitation techniques. According to ATT&CK framework, this vulnerability would be classified under privilege escalation techniques, specifically targeting kernel-mode defenses and potentially mapping to techniques such as T1068 for local privilege escalation through kernel exploits. Organizations should also consider implementing least privilege principles and ensuring that security software operates with the minimal necessary privileges to reduce the impact of such vulnerabilities. The disputed nature of this vulnerability underscores the importance of maintaining updated security software and understanding the nuanced nature of protection mechanism flaws.