CVE-2010-5180 in Virusblockada32
Summary
by MITRE
** DISPUTED ** Race condition in VBA32 Personal 3.12.12.4 on Windows XP allows local users to bypass kernel-mode hook handlers, and execute dangerous code that would otherwise be blocked by a handler but not blocked by signature-based malware detection, via certain user-space memory changes during hook-handler execution, aka an argument-switch attack or a KHOBE attack. NOTE: this issue is disputed by some third parties because it is a flaw in a protection mechanism for situations where a crafted program has already begun to execute.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 02/19/2019
The vulnerability described in CVE-2010-5180 represents a sophisticated race condition within the VBA32 Personal 3.12.12.4 security solution running on Windows XP systems. This flaw operates at the kernel mode level and specifically targets the hook handler mechanism that is fundamental to many anti-malware and security applications. The vulnerability is classified as a race condition under CWE-362, which occurs when two or more threads or processes access shared resources concurrently, leading to unpredictable behavior. The affected system operates with a protection mechanism that is designed to intercept and block malicious activities through kernel-mode hooks that monitor system calls and memory operations.
The technical exploitation of this vulnerability involves a complex attack pattern known as argument-switch or KHOBE (Kernel Hook Override By Execution) attack. During the execution of kernel-mode hook handlers, local users can manipulate user-space memory in such a way that they effectively bypass the protection mechanisms that would normally block malicious code execution. This occurs because the hook handler executes with certain assumptions about memory state, but these assumptions are violated during the race window when the malicious user-space process modifies memory contents. The attack leverages the timing aspect of the system operation, where the hook handler is in the process of executing but has not yet completed its validation checks.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant as it allows attackers to execute code that would normally be blocked by the security system's hook handlers, while remaining undetected by signature-based malware detection mechanisms. This creates a dangerous scenario where an attacker can bypass multiple layers of security protection simultaneously, effectively rendering the kernel-mode hook protection mechanisms ineffective. The vulnerability essentially allows privilege escalation and code execution that would otherwise be prevented by the security system's designed protections, making it particularly concerning for environments where VBA32 is deployed as a primary security solution.
The disputed nature of this vulnerability stems from the fact that it operates within a protection mechanism designed for scenarios where a malicious program has already begun execution. This creates a fundamental debate about the nature of the vulnerability itself, as some security experts argue that it represents a flaw in the security architecture rather than a direct vulnerability in the protected system. The attack requires local user access and leverages a timing condition that exists in the interaction between user-space and kernel-space memory management, making it a complex attack vector that requires deep understanding of Windows kernel internals and memory management systems. The vulnerability highlights the challenges in designing secure hook-based protection systems where the timing and state management of kernel operations can be manipulated by malicious actors.
The mitigation strategies for this vulnerability involve addressing the race condition through improved synchronization mechanisms, enhanced hook handler validation, and potentially updating or replacing the vulnerable security solution. System administrators should consider implementing additional monitoring and detection mechanisms beyond signature-based approaches, as the vulnerability demonstrates that traditional detection methods can be bypassed. The issue also underscores the importance of maintaining current security solutions and understanding the limitations of protection mechanisms that rely on timing and state assumptions. Organizations should implement comprehensive security monitoring that can detect anomalous memory access patterns and kernel behavior that might indicate exploitation attempts. The vulnerability serves as a reminder that even sophisticated kernel-mode protection systems can be compromised through careful exploitation of timing conditions and memory management vulnerabilities, emphasizing the need for layered security approaches that do not rely solely on hook-based protection mechanisms.