CVE-2010-5237 in PowerDirector
Summary
by MITRE
Untrusted search path vulnerability in CyberLink PowerDirector 7 allows local users to gain privileges via a Trojan horse mfc71loc.dll file in the current working directory, as demonstrated by a directory that contains a .pdl, .iso, .pds, .p2g, or .p2i file. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 02/20/2019
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2010-5237 represents a critical untrusted search path issue within CyberLink PowerDirector 7 software, specifically targeting local users who may inadvertently execute malicious code through carefully crafted file operations. This weakness stems from the application's improper handling of dynamic link library loading mechanisms, where the software fails to properly validate or restrict the search paths used to locate required system components. The vulnerability manifests when the application processes media files with extensions such as .pdl, .iso, .pds, .p2g, or .p2i, which trigger the loading of external libraries from the current working directory without adequate security checks.
The technical flaw exploits a fundamental weakness in the software's library resolution process, where the application searches for required DLL files in a predictable order that includes the current working directory before examining system paths. This behavior creates an opportunity for privilege escalation attacks, as a malicious actor can place a specially crafted mfc71loc.dll file in the same directory as a targeted media file. The malicious DLL would then be loaded and executed with the privileges of the user running PowerDirector, potentially allowing for arbitrary code execution and system compromise. This vulnerability directly maps to CWE-427 Uncontrolled Search Path Element, which describes how applications fail to properly control the search paths used to locate libraries and executables.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple privilege escalation, as it provides attackers with a method to execute malicious code without requiring administrative privileges or complex exploitation techniques. Local users who open media files processed by PowerDirector 7 become potential victims of this attack vector, making it particularly dangerous in environments where users may encounter untrusted media content. The attack requires minimal user interaction, as simply opening a maliciously crafted file with one of the supported extensions can trigger the vulnerability. This characteristic aligns with ATT&CK technique T1068, which covers the use of local privilege escalation methods, and demonstrates how seemingly benign file operations can be leveraged for malicious purposes.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should focus on both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. Software vendors should implement proper DLL loading mechanisms that prioritize system paths over current working directories and utilize secure library loading practices such as LoadLibrary with explicit path specifications. Users can protect themselves by avoiding opening media files from untrusted sources and ensuring their software is updated to versions that address this vulnerability. Additionally, system administrators should consider implementing application whitelisting policies and monitoring for unusual DLL loading patterns. The vulnerability also highlights the importance of proper security testing during software development, particularly regarding library loading and search path resolution behaviors that could be exploited by attackers. Organizations should conduct regular security assessments to identify similar untrusted search path vulnerabilities in other applications and ensure that security patches are applied promptly to prevent exploitation.