CVE-2010-5264 in Prof-UIS
Summary
by MITRE
Untrusted search path vulnerability in the CExtDWM::CExtDWM method in ProfUIS290m.dll and ProfUIS290m-RDE.dll in Prof-UIS before 2.9.1 allows local users to gain privileges via a Trojan horse dwmapi.dll file in the current working directory. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 02/21/2019
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2010-5264 represents a critical untrusted search path weakness affecting the Prof-UIS library versions prior to 2.9.1. This flaw specifically resides within the CExtDWM::CExtDWM method located in ProfUIS290m.dll and ProfUIS290m-RDE.dll components. The issue stems from improper handling of dynamic link library loading sequences where the application fails to validate the source and authenticity of loaded modules, creating an exploitable condition that can be leveraged by local attackers to escalate privileges.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability exploits the Windows Desktop Window Manager (DWM) integration within the Prof-UIS framework. When the application executes and attempts to load the dwmapi.dll library, it follows a search path that includes the current working directory before checking system directories. This behavior creates an opportunity for attackers to place a malicious dwmapi.dll file in the application's working directory, which will then be loaded in preference to the legitimate system library. The vulnerability is classified under CWE-427 Uncontrolled Search Path Element, which specifically addresses the dangerous practice of including the current working directory in library search paths without proper validation.
The operational impact of this privilege escalation vulnerability is significant as it allows local users to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges. Attackers can craft a malicious dwmapi.dll file that mimics the legitimate library's interface while executing malicious payloads, potentially leading to full system compromise. This type of attack falls under the ATT&CK technique T1068 Privilege Escalation through DLL Side-Loading, where adversaries leverage legitimate system processes to load malicious code. The vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it operates at the system level where the loaded library interfaces directly with Windows DWM functionality, providing attackers with access to core desktop window management services.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability involve multiple layers of defense. The primary remediation is to upgrade to Prof-UIS version 2.9.1 or later, which addresses the untrusted search path issue through proper library loading mechanisms. System administrators should implement the principle of least privilege by ensuring applications run with minimal required permissions and avoid executing with administrative privileges when possible. Additionally, the Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policies can be configured to restrict loading of unsigned or untrusted DLLs, while the use of AppLocker can help prevent execution of unauthorized binaries. Network segmentation and monitoring should be implemented to detect suspicious file creation patterns in application directories, particularly in locations where user interaction might occur. The vulnerability also highlights the importance of secure coding practices including explicit path specification for library loading operations and implementing proper DLL search path security measures to prevent exploitation through path manipulation techniques.