CVE-2011-1386 in Tivoli Federated Identity Manager
Summary
by MITRE
IBM Tivoli Federated Identity Manager (TFIM) and Tivoli Federated Identity Manager Business Gateway (TFIMBG) 6.1.1, 6.2.0, and 6.2.1 do not properly handle signature validations based on SAML 1.0, 1.1, and 2.0, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended authentication or authorization requirements via a non-conforming SAML signature.
If you want to get the best quality for vulnerability data then you always have to consider VulDB.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 04/17/2017
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2011-1386 affects IBM Tivoli Federated Identity Manager and its Business Gateway components across specific versions 6.1.1, 6.2.0, and 6.2.1. This issue represents a critical weakness in the security architecture of federated identity systems that rely on SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) protocols for authentication and authorization. The flaw specifically targets the signature validation mechanisms that are fundamental to ensuring the integrity and authenticity of SAML assertions within federated identity environments.
The technical root cause of this vulnerability lies in the improper handling of SAML signature validations across multiple SAML versions including 1.0, 1.1, and 2.0. When systems process SAML assertions, they must validate digital signatures to confirm that the assertions originate from legitimate sources and have not been tampered with during transmission. The vulnerability arises because the affected IBM products fail to properly enforce strict signature validation rules, allowing attackers to craft SAML signatures that do not conform to the expected standards but still pass validation checks. This weakness enables attackers to exploit the signature validation process through crafted SAML messages that contain non-conforming signatures.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and far-reaching within federated identity ecosystems. Attackers can leverage this weakness to bypass intended authentication and authorization controls, potentially gaining unauthorized access to protected resources and services that depend on the federated identity infrastructure. The vulnerability undermines the core security assurances that SAML-based federated identity systems are designed to provide, making it possible for malicious actors to impersonate legitimate users or service providers. This compromise can lead to data breaches, unauthorized system access, and the potential for lateral movement within networks that rely on these identity federation services.
Organizations implementing affected IBM Tivoli Federated Identity Manager solutions face significant risk exposure from this vulnerability, particularly those with extensive federated identity deployments and complex multi-domain authentication requirements. The impact extends beyond simple access control violations to encompass potential data integrity compromises and service disruption. The vulnerability's exploitation does not require privileged access or specialized knowledge beyond understanding SAML protocol behavior, making it particularly dangerous as it can be leveraged by attackers with minimal technical expertise.
The security implications of this vulnerability align with CWE-347, which addresses improper certificate validation and signature verification weaknesses in security protocols. From an adversarial perspective, this vulnerability maps to several ATT&CK techniques including T1550.001 for use of valid credentials and T1078.004 for valid accounts. Organizations should implement immediate mitigations including applying the latest IBM security patches, strengthening SAML signature validation policies, and monitoring for suspicious authentication patterns. Additional defensive measures may involve implementing additional authentication layers, network segmentation, and enhanced logging of SAML assertion processing activities to detect potential exploitation attempts.
The broader implications for federated identity security highlight the critical importance of robust signature validation mechanisms in identity federation protocols. This vulnerability demonstrates how seemingly minor implementation flaws in security-critical components can have devastating consequences for entire federated identity ecosystems. Organizations should conduct comprehensive security assessments of their identity federation infrastructure and ensure that all components maintain strict adherence to established SAML standards and security best practices. The incident underscores the necessity for continuous security monitoring and regular vulnerability assessments in complex identity management environments where trust relationships between multiple identity providers and service providers are established.