CVE-2012-6578 in Request Tracker
Summary
by MITRE
Best Practical Solutions RT 3.8.x before 3.8.15 and 4.0.x before 4.0.8, when GnuPG is enabled with a "Sign by default" queue configuration, uses a queue s key for signing, which might allow remote attackers to spoof messages by leveraging the lack of authentication semantics.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 01/04/2022
This vulnerability exists in Best Practical Solutions RT versions prior to 3.8.15 and 4.0.8 where the system employs GnuPG for message signing. The flaw occurs when the "Sign by default" queue configuration is enabled, causing the system to utilize the queue's private key for signing messages without proper authentication verification. This configuration creates a significant security weakness that allows remote attackers to potentially forge messages by exploiting the absence of proper authentication semantics during the signing process. The vulnerability stems from improper key management and authentication controls within the message signing workflow.
The technical implementation of this flaw involves the system's failure to validate the authenticity of the signing entity before applying the queue's cryptographic key. When GnuPG is configured to sign messages automatically, the system assumes the legitimacy of the queue's key without verifying that the message originates from an authorized source. This design flaw creates an attack vector where malicious actors can manipulate the system to sign forged messages using the legitimate queue key, effectively bypassing the intended security controls. The vulnerability specifically targets the authentication mechanisms within the cryptographic signing process, which should verify the message source before applying digital signatures.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is substantial as it allows attackers to create convincing fraudulent communications that appear to originate from legitimate sources within the RT system. Remote attackers can leverage this weakness to spoof messages, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data manipulation, or social engineering attacks that exploit the trust associated with signed communications. The ability to forge signed messages undermines the integrity of the entire communication system and can compromise the security posture of organizations relying on RT for issue tracking and communication management. This vulnerability particularly affects environments where message authenticity is critical for security operations and audit trails.
Organizations should immediately upgrade to RT versions 3.8.15 or 4.0.8 to address this vulnerability. The recommended mitigation includes disabling the automatic signing feature when GnuPG is enabled, implementing proper authentication checks before message signing, and ensuring that queue keys are properly managed and secured. Additionally, organizations should review their queue configurations to eliminate the "Sign by default" setting in environments where message authenticity cannot be properly verified. This vulnerability aligns with CWE-327 (Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm) and CWE-287 (Improper Authentication) and maps to ATT&CK technique T1566 (Phishing) and T1556 (Modify Authentication Process) as it enables attackers to create convincing fraudulent communications that bypass authentication mechanisms. The fix requires careful configuration review and implementation of proper cryptographic key management practices to prevent unauthorized message signing operations.