CVE-2013-6419 in Havana
Summary
by MITRE
Interaction error in OpenStack Nova and Neutron before Havana 2013.2.1 and icehouse-1 does not validate the instance ID of the tenant making a request, which allows remote tenants to obtain sensitive metadata by spoofing the device ID that is bound to a port, which is not properly handled by (1) api/metadata/handler.py in Nova and (2) the neutron-metadata-agent (agent/metadata/agent.py) in Neutron.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 01/18/2022
The vulnerability described in CVE-2013-6419 represents a critical interaction error within OpenStack Nova and Neutron platforms that undermines fundamental security controls for tenant isolation. This flaw exists in versions prior to Havana 2013.2.1 and icehouse-1, affecting the metadata service components that are essential for cloud infrastructure operations. The vulnerability stems from inadequate validation mechanisms that fail to properly authenticate and authorize tenant requests based on instance identifiers, creating a pathway for unauthorized access to sensitive metadata resources.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability occurs in two primary locations within the OpenStack ecosystem. The first vulnerability exists in the api/metadata/handler.py file within Nova, where the system fails to validate that the instance ID belongs to the requesting tenant. The second vulnerability resides in the neutron-metadata-agent component at agent/metadata/agent.py in Neutron, which similarly lacks proper validation of tenant credentials when processing metadata requests. Both components operate under the assumption that device IDs bound to network ports are trustworthy without verifying the actual tenant ownership of those resources.
This security flaw enables remote tenants to exploit the metadata service by spoofing device IDs associated with network ports that belong to other tenants. When a malicious tenant submits a request with a forged device ID, the system processes the request without proper validation of the tenant's authorization to access the target metadata. This creates a significant information disclosure risk where unauthorized parties can access sensitive metadata information that should be restricted to specific tenant domains. The vulnerability essentially allows cross-tenant metadata access through manipulation of network port bindings.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple information disclosure to potentially compromise the entire multi-tenant cloud infrastructure. Attackers can leverage this flaw to gather confidential information about other tenants' instances, including instance identifiers, network configurations, and potentially sensitive deployment details that could aid in further exploitation. The vulnerability undermines the fundamental security model of cloud computing where tenant isolation is paramount for maintaining security boundaries between different organizations using the same infrastructure.
This vulnerability maps to CWE-284, which describes improper access control, and aligns with several ATT&CK techniques including T1083 (File and Directory Discovery) and T1046 (Network Service Scanning) as attackers can systematically enumerate metadata resources. The flaw also corresponds to ATT&CK technique T1566 (Phishing with Social Engineering) as it could be exploited in conjunction with social engineering campaigns to gather additional information about target tenants. Organizations should implement immediate mitigations including upgrading to patched versions of OpenStack Nova and Neutron, implementing additional validation layers, and monitoring for suspicious metadata access patterns.
The remediation approach requires organizations to upgrade their OpenStack deployments to versions that include proper tenant validation mechanisms for metadata requests. Security administrators should also implement network segmentation controls and additional logging to detect unauthorized metadata access attempts. Regular security assessments should verify that metadata service components properly validate tenant identities and that network port bindings are appropriately secured against spoofing attacks. Organizations must also review their access control policies to ensure that metadata service endpoints are properly protected against cross-tenant information leakage.