CVE-2014-1883 in PhoneGap
Summary
by MITRE
Adobe PhoneGap before 2.6.0 on Android uses the shouldOverrideUrlLoading callback instead of the proper shouldInterceptRequest callback, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended device-resource restrictions via content that is accessed (1) in an IFRAME element or (2) with the XMLHttpRequest method by a crafted application.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 04/13/2025
Adobe PhoneGap versions prior to 2.6.0 on Android platforms implemented a security flaw in their web view handling mechanism that created a significant bypass vulnerability for device resource restrictions. The vulnerability stemmed from the improper use of the shouldOverrideUrlLoading callback instead of the more appropriate shouldInterceptRequest callback when processing web requests within the Android WebView component. This design decision allowed malicious actors to circumvent intended security controls that were meant to prevent unauthorized access to device resources such as the file system, network interfaces, and other sensitive components.
The technical flaw specifically exploited the difference between these two callback mechanisms within the Android WebView API. The shouldOverrideUrlLoading callback is primarily designed to handle URL navigation decisions and does not provide the necessary interception capabilities for monitoring and controlling resource requests at the network level. In contrast, shouldInterceptRequest offers comprehensive request interception that can examine and modify HTTP requests before they are processed, making it the appropriate choice for implementing security controls. When PhoneGap used the wrong callback, it failed to properly filter or restrict access to local resources, creating opportunities for attackers to access protected device functionality through crafted web content.
Attackers could leverage this vulnerability through two primary vectors: iframe-based content loading and XMLHttpRequest method usage. When content was loaded within an iframe element, the improper callback handling allowed malicious code to access device resources that should have been restricted. Similarly, when applications used XMLHttpRequest to make network requests, the vulnerability enabled attackers to bypass restrictions on accessing local resources or sensitive device information. This dual attack surface significantly increased the potential impact of exploitation, as it could be triggered through multiple legitimate application usage patterns. The vulnerability essentially created a backdoor that allowed remote attackers to gain unauthorized access to device resources that were intended to be protected from web-based applications.
The operational impact of this vulnerability was substantial for any PhoneGap application running on Android devices with affected versions. Organizations using PhoneGap for mobile application development faced potential data breaches, unauthorized device access, and possible escalation to more severe security incidents. The vulnerability was particularly concerning because it could be exploited without requiring any special privileges or user interaction beyond visiting malicious web content or installing compromised applications. The security implications extended beyond simple data access, as attackers could potentially access sensitive device information, intercept communications, or manipulate device functionality through the bypassed restrictions.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability required immediate action from developers and system administrators. The primary solution involved upgrading to PhoneGap version 2.6.0 or later, which properly implemented the shouldInterceptRequest callback for resource access control. Organizations should have also reviewed their applications for proper WebView configuration and ensured that all security controls were correctly implemented. Additionally, developers needed to understand the Android WebView security model and properly configure their applications to use the correct callback mechanisms. Security teams should have conducted thorough vulnerability assessments of their PhoneGap applications and implemented monitoring for suspicious network activity that might indicate exploitation attempts. This vulnerability highlighted the importance of proper API usage and callback implementation in mobile application security, emphasizing that seemingly minor implementation details can have significant security consequences. The issue also demonstrated the need for comprehensive security testing of mobile frameworks and the importance of staying current with security patches and updates.