CVE-2014-2941 in Sailor 6300
Summary
by MITRE
** DISPUTED ** Cobham Sailor 6000 satellite terminals have hardcoded Tbus 2 credentials, which allows remote attackers to obtain access via a TBUS2 command. NOTE: the vendor reportedly states "there is no possibility to exploit another user s credentials."
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/21/2024
The Cobham Sailor 6000 satellite terminal represents a critical communication device used in maritime and remote operations where secure connectivity is paramount. This device operates using TBUS2 protocol for communication and management functions, making it a potential target for attackers seeking unauthorized access to sensitive maritime communications infrastructure. The vulnerability stems from the device's implementation of hardcoded credentials within its firmware, specifically related to Tbus 2 authentication mechanisms. This design flaw fundamentally compromises the security model of the system by embedding static authentication information that cannot be changed or updated through normal operational procedures.
The technical exploitation of this vulnerability occurs through the TBUS2 command interface, which allows remote attackers to leverage the hardcoded credentials to establish unauthorized access to the satellite terminal. The presence of hardcoded credentials creates a persistent security weakness that remains viable throughout the device's operational lifetime, regardless of standard security updates or configuration changes. This issue falls under the category of weak credential management and hardcoded authentication information, which aligns with CWE-798 and CWE-259 vulnerability classifications. The attack vector is particularly concerning as it enables remote exploitation without requiring any prior knowledge of legitimate user credentials, making it accessible to attackers with minimal technical expertise.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple unauthorized access to encompass potential disruption of critical maritime communications, data interception, and possible system compromise. Maritime operations rely heavily on secure satellite communications for navigation, emergency response, and operational coordination, making the exploitation of such vulnerabilities particularly dangerous. The vendor's assertion that "there is no possibility to exploit another user's credentials" suggests they may be attempting to minimize the scope of impact, but this statement is problematic as hardcoded credentials typically provide access to the system itself rather than specific user accounts. This vulnerability represents a fundamental architectural flaw that undermines the security posture of the entire communication infrastructure it supports.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should focus on immediate firmware updates from the vendor, although the nature of hardcoded credentials suggests that complete remediation may require device replacement or hardware modification. Network segmentation and access controls should be implemented to limit exposure of these devices to untrusted networks, while regular security assessments should monitor for similar hardcoded credential implementations. The vulnerability demonstrates the importance of secure development practices and proper authentication design, aligning with ATT&CK technique T1078 for valid accounts and T1566 for credential harvesting. Organizations should also consider implementing network monitoring to detect unauthorized access attempts and establish incident response procedures specifically addressing satellite communication system compromises.