CVE-2014-5649 in Ilove - Free Dating! Chat App
Summary
by MITRE
The iLove - Free Dating & Chat App (aka com.jestadigital.android.ilove) application 1.3.3 for Android does not verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/27/2024
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2014-5649 affects the iLove Free Dating & Chat App version 1.3.3 for Android devices, representing a critical security flaw in the application's implementation of secure communication protocols. This weakness stems from the application's failure to properly validate X.509 certificates during SSL/TLS connections, creating an exploitable gap in the security architecture that undermines the fundamental principles of secure network communication.
The technical flaw manifests as a complete absence of certificate verification mechanisms within the application's SSL implementation. When the app establishes connections to remote servers, it accepts any certificate presented without performing the essential validation steps that should confirm the certificate's authenticity, proper signing authority, and validity period. This vulnerability directly relates to CWE-295, which specifically addresses the improper certificate validation issue, and falls under the broader category of weak cryptographic implementations that expose applications to man-in-the-middle attacks. The absence of certificate pinning or proper trust chain validation means that attackers can intercept communications by presenting fraudulent certificates that appear legitimate to the vulnerable application.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends far beyond simple data interception, as it creates a complete breakdown in the application's security model that can result in severe privacy and data compromise. Attackers can exploit this weakness to perform man-in-the-middle attacks by positioning themselves between the user and the server, presenting a crafted certificate that the application accepts without question. This allows malicious actors to decrypt and modify sensitive user communications, potentially accessing personal information, chat messages, user credentials, and other confidential data transmitted through the application. The vulnerability is particularly dangerous in the context of dating and chat applications where users often share highly personal information, making the potential attack surface extremely valuable to threat actors.
The implications of this vulnerability align with several tactics and techniques documented in the MITRE ATT&CK framework, specifically relating to initial access and credential access phases. Attackers can leverage this weakness to establish persistent access to user accounts and maintain long-term surveillance capabilities. The vulnerability also represents a failure in the application's secure coding practices and security architecture, as proper SSL certificate validation should be implemented as a fundamental security control. Organizations and developers should implement certificate pinning mechanisms, proper trust store management, and regular security assessments to prevent similar issues from occurring in mobile applications. The affected application's security model demonstrates a critical gap in its defense-in-depth strategy, where the absence of certificate verification creates a single point of failure that completely undermines the security of all communications between the client and server components.