CVE-2014-5729 in Viddy
Summary
by MITRE
The Viddy (aka com.viddy.Viddy) application 1.3.9 for Android does not verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/30/2024
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2014-5729 represents a critical security flaw in the Viddy Android application version 1.3.9, specifically within its implementation of secure communication protocols. This issue falls under the category of improper certificate validation, where the application fails to properly verify the authenticity of SSL/TLS certificates presented by remote servers during secure connections. The vulnerability exposes users to significant risk during network communications, as it eliminates the cryptographic verification mechanisms that are fundamental to establishing trust between client and server in secure web transactions.
The technical flaw manifests in the application's failure to perform proper X.509 certificate validation during SSL handshakes, which is a core security control defined by industry standards including those outlined in the OWASP Mobile Top 10 and NIST SP 800-57 guidelines. When an application does not validate SSL certificates, it essentially removes the cryptographic assurance that the server presenting the certificate is indeed the legitimate entity it claims to be. This allows attackers to perform man-in-the-middle attacks by presenting forged certificates that appear legitimate to the vulnerable application. The certificate validation process should typically involve checking certificate authorities, expiration dates, and certificate chains against trusted root certificates, but this implementation fails to perform these essential checks.
From an operational impact perspective, this vulnerability creates a significant attack surface that enables adversaries to intercept and potentially modify communications between the Viddy application and its backend services. Attackers can exploit this weakness to capture sensitive user data, session tokens, and other confidential information transmitted over the network. The vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it affects the core security infrastructure of the application, potentially compromising user privacy and data integrity. According to ATT&CK framework category T1573, this represents a technique for "Encrypted Channel" where adversaries establish secure communication channels to avoid detection while exfiltrating data. The impact extends beyond simple data theft to include potential account takeovers, credential theft, and unauthorized access to user accounts that rely on the application for functionality.
The mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should focus on implementing proper certificate pinning mechanisms and ensuring robust SSL/TLS certificate validation. Security recommendations include implementing certificate pinning to prevent the use of fraudulent certificates, configuring the application to validate certificate chains against trusted certificate authorities, and ensuring that certificate expiration dates are properly checked. Organizations should also consider implementing certificate transparency monitoring and regular security audits of their mobile applications. The fix should align with CWE-295, which specifically addresses "Improper Certificate Validation," and should follow industry best practices outlined in RFC 6125 for hostname verification. Additionally, the application should be updated to include proper error handling for certificate validation failures, ensuring that connections are terminated when certificate validation cannot be completed successfully. This vulnerability underscores the critical importance of proper cryptographic implementation in mobile applications and serves as a reminder of the need for comprehensive security testing throughout the software development lifecycle.