CVE-2014-5816 in MeiPai
Summary
by MITRE
The MeiPai (aka com.meitu.meipaimv) application 1.2.0 for Android does not verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/02/2024
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2014-5816 affects the MeiPai application version 1.2.0 for Android platforms, representing a critical security flaw in the application's implementation of secure communication protocols. This issue stems from the application's failure to properly validate X.509 certificates during SSL/TLS connections, creating a significant attack vector for malicious actors seeking to compromise user data. The vulnerability operates at the core of the application's network security architecture, where it should be enforcing certificate verification but instead accepts any certificate presented by a server, regardless of its authenticity or trustworthiness. This fundamental flaw directly violates established security protocols and exposes users to potential data interception and manipulation.
The technical implementation flaw manifests in the application's SSL certificate validation mechanism, which is designed to ensure that communications between the mobile client and remote servers remain secure and authenticated. When an application properly implements SSL/TLS security, it should validate the server's X.509 certificate against trusted certificate authorities and verify that the certificate matches the expected hostname. However, the MeiPai application fails to perform these essential validation steps, allowing attackers to present forged certificates that appear legitimate to the application. This vulnerability maps directly to CWE-295, which specifically addresses "Improper Certificate Validation," and represents a classic example of how weak cryptographic implementation can undermine the entire security framework of a mobile application.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data interception, as it creates a comprehensive attack surface for man-in-the-middle operations that can compromise user privacy and sensitive information. Attackers exploiting this vulnerability can establish fake servers that appear authentic to the application, potentially capturing user credentials, personal communications, financial data, and other sensitive information transmitted through the application. The implications are particularly severe given that MeiPai is a multimedia sharing application that likely handles user-generated content, personal photos, and potentially private communications. This vulnerability enables attackers to not only spy on user activities but also to inject malicious content or manipulate data in transit, potentially leading to identity theft, privacy violations, and other forms of cybercrime.
From a threat modeling perspective, this vulnerability aligns with several ATT&CK framework techniques including T1046 Network Service Scanning and T1566 Phishing, as attackers can leverage the insecure SSL implementation to establish malicious connections that appear legitimate to users. The attack surface is particularly concerning because it affects all network communications within the application, making it a comprehensive security weakness rather than a targeted vulnerability. Security professionals should note that this vulnerability demonstrates the critical importance of proper certificate validation in mobile applications, as it represents a failure in the fundamental security architecture that can be exploited to compromise the entire application ecosystem. The vulnerability also highlights the need for robust security testing practices during mobile application development, particularly around cryptographic implementations and secure communication protocols.
Organizations and developers should implement immediate mitigations including proper certificate pinning mechanisms, ensuring that the application validates certificates against trusted authorities, and implementing hostname verification checks. The recommended approach involves configuring the application to reject self-signed certificates and to verify certificate chains against established certificate authorities. Additionally, developers should implement certificate pinning to prevent the application from accepting certificates from unknown or untrusted sources, thereby creating multiple layers of protection against this specific vulnerability. This vulnerability serves as a critical reminder of the importance of cryptographic security in mobile applications and the necessity of thorough security testing before deployment to production environments.