CVE-2014-5866 in CA DMV
Summary
by MITRE
The CA DMV (aka gov.ca.dmv) application 2 for Android does not verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/04/2024
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2014-5866 affects the California Department of Motor Vehicles mobile application for android devices, specifically version 2 of the gov.ca.dmv application. This security flaw represents a critical failure in the application's cryptographic implementation, where the software fails to properly validate X.509 certificates during secure socket layer communications. The absence of certificate verification creates a significant attack surface that enables malicious actors to perform man-in-the-middle attacks against unsuspecting users. This vulnerability directly impacts the integrity and confidentiality of data transmitted between the mobile application and remote servers, potentially exposing sensitive user information to unauthorized parties.
The technical flaw manifests in the application's failure to implement proper certificate pinning or validation mechanisms that are standard practice in secure mobile applications. When an application establishes SSL/TLS connections, it should verify that the server's certificate is valid, properly signed by a trusted certificate authority, and matches the expected hostname. The CA DMV application bypasses these essential security checks, allowing attackers to present fraudulent certificates that appear legitimate to the application. This weakness aligns with CWE-295, which describes improper certificate validation, and represents a fundamental failure in the application's security architecture. The vulnerability essentially removes the cryptographic protection that SSL/TLS is designed to provide, leaving communications vulnerable to interception and manipulation.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data theft, as it undermines the trust model that secure mobile applications must maintain with their users. Mobile applications that handle sensitive personal information such as driver's license details, vehicle registration data, and other government-issued identifiers become particularly vulnerable when they fail to implement proper certificate verification. Attackers can exploit this weakness to intercept user credentials, personal identification information, and other sensitive data transmitted through the application. This vulnerability is particularly concerning in the context of the ATT&CK framework, specifically under the T1046 technique for network service scanning and T1566 for credential access through social engineering, as it provides a direct path for attackers to establish unauthorized communication channels with the application's backend services.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should focus on implementing robust certificate verification mechanisms within the application's network communication layer. The recommended approach involves implementing certificate pinning, where the application explicitly trusts specific certificate authorities or certificate fingerprints rather than relying on the system's default trust store. Additionally, the application should implement proper hostname verification to ensure that certificates are only accepted for the intended domains. Security patches should include comprehensive certificate validation routines that check certificate expiration dates, signature validity, and chain of trust. Organizations should also consider implementing additional security controls such as mutual authentication and regular security audits of network communications. The fix should align with industry best practices outlined in NIST SP 800-52 for certificate management and should address the underlying architectural flaw that allowed the certificate verification to be bypassed entirely.