CVE-2014-5972 in Loving - Couple Essential
Summary
by MITRE
The Loving - Couple Essential (aka com.xiaoenai.app) application 4.0.1 for Android does not verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/08/2024
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2014-5972 affects the Loving - Couple Essential Android application version 4.0.1, representing a critical security flaw in the application's implementation of secure communication protocols. This issue resides within the application's certificate validation mechanism, specifically within its handling of SSL/TLS connections to remote servers. The flaw manifests when the application fails to properly verify X.509 certificates presented by SSL servers during the secure connection establishment process. This failure creates a significant security gap that directly violates fundamental principles of secure communications and cryptographic protocol implementation. The vulnerability is classified under CWE-295 which specifically addresses improper certificate validation, making it a direct descendant of well-established security weaknesses in certificate trust validation processes. From an operational perspective, this vulnerability enables sophisticated attackers to execute man-in-the-middle attacks against unsuspecting users of the application, effectively allowing them to intercept and manipulate communications between the mobile application and its backend services.
The technical implementation flaw stems from the application's incomplete or missing certificate verification routines within its SSL/TLS stack integration. When establishing secure connections, the application should validate certificate chains against trusted certificate authorities and perform proper hostname verification to ensure that communications occur with the intended server. However, in this case, the application appears to accept any certificate presented by the server without sufficient validation checks, creating an environment where attackers can generate or obtain malicious certificates that will be accepted by the application. This behavior directly contradicts industry standards and best practices outlined in security frameworks such as the OWASP Mobile Security Project and NIST guidelines for secure mobile application development. The vulnerability represents a failure in the application's cryptographic implementation, specifically in the certificate validation phase of the TLS handshake process, where the application should enforce proper certificate chain validation but instead accepts potentially malicious certificates.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and multifaceted, particularly given the nature of the application's functionality as a couple communication tool that likely handles sensitive personal data, private messages, and potentially financial information. Attackers exploiting this vulnerability can intercept user communications, modify data in transit, and potentially gain access to personal information that users trust the application to protect. The attack surface is particularly concerning because the vulnerability affects the core communication security mechanisms of the application, meaning that all data transmitted between the mobile device and the application servers becomes potentially accessible to attackers. This flaw can be exploited through various attack vectors including public Wi-Fi networks, compromised network infrastructure, or even through compromised network devices, making the attack surface quite broad. The vulnerability also enables credential harvesting, session hijacking, and data exfiltration attacks that could compromise user privacy and potentially lead to identity theft or financial fraud. From an attacker's perspective, this vulnerability maps directly to the MITM technique described in the MITRE ATT&CK framework under the T1041 tactic for data encryption for impact and T1566 for credential access through network infiltration.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements to ensure proper certificate validation. The primary immediate fix involves implementing proper certificate pinning mechanisms within the application, where the application maintains a whitelist of trusted certificates or public keys and validates incoming certificates against this trusted set. Additionally, the application should enforce standard certificate chain validation procedures including hostname verification, certificate expiration checks, and validation against trusted certificate authorities. Organizations should implement certificate transparency monitoring and consider deploying certificate monitoring solutions to detect potential certificate misuse or impersonation attempts. The application architecture should be redesigned to incorporate proper cryptographic libraries and security frameworks that enforce certificate validation by default, rather than relying on manual implementation that can introduce errors. Regular security audits and penetration testing should be conducted to ensure that certificate validation mechanisms remain robust against evolving attack techniques. From a compliance standpoint, this vulnerability would likely violate various regulatory requirements including HIPAA for healthcare data, PCI DSS for financial information, and GDPR for personal data protection, making proper remediation not just a security necessity but a legal requirement for organizations handling sensitive user information.