CVE-2014-6712 in Airlines International
Summary
by MITRE
The Airlines International (aka org.iata.IAMagazine) application 1.0 for Android does not verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/13/2024
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2014-6712 affects the Airlines International Android application version 1.0, specifically targeting the application's SSL/TLS certificate validation mechanism. This represents a critical security flaw that fundamentally undermines the application's ability to establish secure communications with backend servers. The issue stems from the application's failure to properly validate X.509 certificates during SSL handshakes, creating a dangerous trust relationship that adversaries can exploit to compromise the integrity of data transmission between the mobile client and server infrastructure.
The technical flaw manifests in the application's implementation of SSL certificate verification, which is a fundamental security control designed to ensure that clients are communicating with legitimate servers rather than malicious intermediaries. When an application fails to verify X.509 certificates, it essentially disables the certificate pinning mechanism that should validate the server's identity against trusted Certificate Authorities. This vulnerability aligns with CWE-295, which specifically addresses the weakness of inadequate certificate validation and trust verification in secure communications. The absence of proper certificate validation creates an attack surface where man-in-the-middle adversaries can present fraudulent certificates that the application will accept without question, effectively breaking the cryptographic security model that SSL/TLS protocols are designed to provide.
From an operational impact perspective, this vulnerability exposes users to significant risks including sensitive data interception, session hijacking, and potential identity theft. Attackers can exploit this weakness to capture and manipulate communications containing personal information, login credentials, or financial data that users might transmit through the application. The attack vector is particularly concerning because it requires no special privileges or complex exploitation techniques beyond the ability to intercept network traffic and present a valid-looking certificate. This vulnerability directly maps to ATT&CK technique T1046, which involves network service scanning and can be leveraged to establish persistent man-in-the-middle positions within the application's communication channels. The impact extends beyond individual user data exposure to potentially compromise the entire application ecosystem, as compromised communications could lead to broader security breaches within the airline industry's digital infrastructure.
The mitigation strategy for this vulnerability requires immediate implementation of proper SSL certificate validation mechanisms within the application. Developers must ensure that the application validates certificate chains against trusted root certificates, implements certificate pinning where appropriate, and enforces strict hostname verification during SSL handshakes. The solution should incorporate robust certificate validation libraries that properly implement X.509 certificate checking according to established security standards. Organizations should also consider implementing network-level security controls such as SSL inspection and monitoring to detect anomalous certificate usage patterns. Additionally, regular security audits and penetration testing should be conducted to ensure that the application maintains proper certificate validation practices throughout its lifecycle. The fix should address the root cause by ensuring that the application properly validates certificate signatures, expiration dates, and issuer information before establishing secure connections, thereby restoring the cryptographic trust model that SSL/TLS protocols are designed to provide.