CVE-2014-6826 in Tic-Tac To The MAX FREE
Summary
by MITRE
The Tic-Tac To The MAX FREE (aka com.tothemax) application 1.2 for Android does not verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/18/2024
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2014-6826 represents a critical security flaw in the Tic-Tac To The MAX FREE Android application version 1.2, where the software fails to properly validate X.509 certificates during SSL/TLS connections. This weakness creates a significant attack surface that enables man-in-the-middle adversaries to establish fraudulent server identities and intercept sensitive data transmitted between the mobile application and remote servers. The vulnerability stems from improper certificate validation mechanisms that should normally verify the authenticity and integrity of SSL certificates before establishing secure communications. According to CWE-295, this flaw corresponds to improper certificate validation, which directly violates fundamental security principles of secure communication protocols. The application's failure to implement proper certificate pinning or validation procedures leaves users exposed to cryptographic attacks that could compromise their personal information, login credentials, or financial data.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability manifests in the application's inability to perform certificate chain validation, hostname verification, or signature validation checks that are standard requirements for secure SSL/TLS implementations. Mobile applications must verify that certificates are issued by trusted Certificate Authorities, that the certificate chain is complete and valid, and that the certificate's subject matches the target server's hostname. In this case, the application accepts any certificate presented by a server without performing these essential validation steps, making it susceptible to attack vectors such as certificate substitution or rogue CA exploitation. The flaw directly aligns with ATT&CK technique T1573.002, which describes the use of insecure communication protocols to capture or manipulate network traffic. This vulnerability essentially disables the security assurances typically provided by the SSL/TLS protocol stack, rendering the application's secure communication layer ineffective.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data interception to encompass potential identity theft, financial fraud, and unauthorized access to user accounts. Attackers could exploit this weakness to redirect users to malicious servers, capture session tokens, or extract sensitive personal information transmitted through the application's network connections. The vulnerability is particularly dangerous in mobile environments where users may connect to public Wi-Fi networks, increasing the attack surface for man-in-the-middle attacks. Given that this affects a mobile application, the risk is amplified by the potential for attackers to leverage public networks, compromised devices, or malicious Wi-Fi access points to establish the necessary conditions for exploitation. The flaw creates a persistent security risk that remains active until the application is updated to implement proper certificate validation mechanisms.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require immediate implementation of certificate validation controls within the application's network security framework. The recommended approach involves implementing proper certificate pinning mechanisms that validate certificate fingerprints against pre-established trust anchors, ensuring that only certificates from known and trusted sources are accepted. Organizations should also implement hostname verification procedures that confirm the certificate's subject matches the target server's domain name, and establish robust certificate chain validation that checks all intermediate certificates in the trust path. Additionally, the application should be updated to utilize modern SSL/TLS protocol versions and cipher suites that provide stronger cryptographic security. According to industry best practices and security standards, this vulnerability should be addressed through comprehensive code review and security testing to ensure that all network communication components properly implement certificate validation as specified in the Android security guidelines and OWASP mobile security project recommendations. The fix must be implemented across all versions of the application and distributed through official channels to ensure user protection.