CVE-2014-7320 in SHIRAKABA
Summary
by MITRE
The SHIRAKABA (aka com.SHIRAKABA) application 1.0 for Android does not verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/02/2024
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2014-7320 resides within the SHIRAKABA Android application version 1.0, representing a critical security flaw in the application's cryptographic implementation. This issue manifests as a failure to properly validate X.509 certificates during SSL/TLS connections, creating a significant pathway for malicious actors to compromise the application's security posture. The vulnerability directly impacts the application's ability to establish trust with remote servers, fundamentally undermining the security guarantees that SSL/TLS protocols are designed to provide.
The technical flaw stems from the application's improper handling of certificate validation processes, specifically failing to perform certificate chain validation and trust verification that are essential components of secure communication. When an Android application establishes an SSL connection, it should validate the server's certificate against a trusted certificate authority and verify that the certificate is valid for the domain being accessed. In this case, the SHIRAKABA application bypasses these critical validation steps, allowing any certificate to be accepted regardless of its authenticity or trustworthiness. This implementation flaw falls under the CWE-295 vulnerability category, which specifically addresses improper certificate validation in secure communication protocols.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and multifaceted, creating multiple attack vectors for man-in-the-middle adversaries who can exploit the weakness to intercept and manipulate communications between the application and its servers. Attackers can present forged certificates that appear legitimate to the vulnerable application, enabling them to eavesdrop on sensitive data transmissions, modify information in transit, or redirect users to malicious websites. The implications extend beyond simple data theft to include potential account compromise, financial fraud, and unauthorized access to confidential information. This vulnerability directly aligns with tactics described in the MITRE ATT&CK framework under the T1046 technique for network service scanning and T1566 for credential harvesting through social engineering, as the compromised application becomes a vector for further attacks.
The consequences of this vulnerability are particularly concerning given the nature of mobile applications and their access to sensitive user data. Mobile applications like SHIRAKABA often handle personal information, financial data, and authentication credentials that make them attractive targets for attackers. The lack of certificate verification means that even if users believe they are communicating securely with legitimate servers, they may actually be communicating with malicious intermediaries. This vulnerability represents a fundamental breakdown in the application's security architecture and demonstrates poor security implementation practices that violate industry standards for mobile application security. Organizations should implement immediate mitigations including certificate pinning, proper certificate validation, and comprehensive security testing to address this vulnerability and prevent exploitation by threat actors. The vulnerability also underscores the importance of following established security frameworks and best practices for mobile application development, particularly those outlined in the OWASP Mobile Security Project and NIST guidelines for secure coding practices.