CVE-2014-7408 in Gary Johnson for President '12
Summary
by MITRE
The Gary Johnson for President 12 (aka com.GaryJohnson2012) application 0.75.13439.53899 for Android does not verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/05/2024
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2014-7408 affects the Gary Johnson for President 12 Android application version 0.75.13439.53899, representing a critical security flaw in the application's implementation of secure communication protocols. This issue stems from the application's failure to properly validate X.509 certificates during SSL/TLS connections, creating a significant attack surface that adversaries can exploit to compromise user data and system integrity.
The technical flaw manifests as a complete absence of certificate verification mechanisms within the application's network communication stack. When the application establishes connections to remote servers using SSL/TLS encryption, it fails to perform the essential step of validating the server's X.509 certificate against trusted certificate authorities. This omission places the application in direct violation of fundamental security principles outlined in industry standards such as CWE-295, which specifically addresses improper certificate validation in security protocols. The vulnerability creates a trust relationship that can be easily manipulated by attackers who possess the capability to generate or obtain fraudulent certificates.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and multifaceted, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks that can intercept and manipulate all network traffic between the application and its servers. Attackers can craft malicious certificates that appear legitimate to the vulnerable application, allowing them to establish fake server identities and decrypt sensitive information transmitted through the application. This includes personal user data, authentication credentials, and any other information that might be exchanged during normal application operation. The vulnerability essentially removes the cryptographic protection that SSL/TLS is designed to provide, rendering the entire communication channel susceptible to eavesdropping and data manipulation.
From a threat modeling perspective, this vulnerability aligns with ATT&CK technique T1041, which describes data compression and encoding techniques used to evade detection, and T1566, which covers spearphishing attacks that can lead to credential theft. The vulnerability creates an environment where attackers can seamlessly impersonate legitimate servers and potentially gain access to user accounts, personal information, or other sensitive data that the application might handle. The attack vector is particularly dangerous because it requires no special privileges or complex exploitation techniques, making it accessible to threat actors with basic knowledge of certificate manipulation.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability must address the fundamental flaw in certificate validation implementation. The primary remediation involves implementing proper certificate pinning mechanisms that validate server certificates against a known set of trusted certificates or public keys. Organizations should also consider implementing certificate transparency checks and ensuring that all SSL/TLS connections perform rigorous validation of certificate chains against trusted root authorities. Additionally, the application should be updated to include proper error handling for certificate validation failures, preventing the application from proceeding with unverified connections. This vulnerability underscores the critical importance of following secure coding practices and adhering to established security frameworks that mandate proper certificate validation as a fundamental requirement for any application handling sensitive data over network connections.