CVE-2014-7448 in DealSide Institutional
Summary
by MITRE
The DealSide Institutional (aka com.magzter.dealsideinstitutional) application 3.1 for Android does not verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/07/2024
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2014-7448 affects the DealSide Institutional Android application version 3.1, representing a critical security flaw in the application's implementation of secure communication protocols. This weakness stems from the application's failure to properly validate X.509 certificates during SSL/TLS connections, creating a significant attack vector that undermines the fundamental security guarantees of encrypted communications. The flaw specifically impacts the application's certificate verification process, which is essential for establishing trust between the mobile client and remote servers. According to CWE-295, this vulnerability maps directly to improper certificate validation, a well-documented weakness that has been consistently flagged as a critical risk in mobile application security. The application's inability to verify certificate authenticity creates a pathway for malicious actors to exploit the trust model that should protect sensitive data transmission.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability demonstrates a classic case of SSL/TLS certificate pinning failure where the application accepts any certificate presented by a server without performing the required validation checks. This includes verifying certificate authorities, checking certificate expiration dates, and ensuring proper certificate chains. Attackers can exploit this weakness by presenting a maliciously crafted certificate that appears to be from a legitimate server, allowing them to intercept and potentially modify communications between the mobile application and backend services. The vulnerability operates at the transport layer security level, specifically targeting the SSL/TLS handshake process where certificate validation should occur. This flaw aligns with ATT&CK technique T1041, which describes data transmission through command and control channels, and represents a critical failure in the application's defense-in-depth strategy.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data interception, as it enables comprehensive man-in-the-middle attacks that can compromise sensitive institutional information. Organizations using this application face significant risks including unauthorized access to proprietary data, financial information, and potentially personal user details that may be transmitted through the vulnerable application. The attack surface is particularly concerning for institutional users who may be handling confidential business information, regulatory compliance data, or sensitive financial transactions. The vulnerability's exploitation requires relatively minimal technical expertise, making it attractive to threat actors who can leverage the weakness to gain unauthorized access to institutional networks and data repositories. This represents a critical security gap that violates industry standards for mobile application security and demonstrates inadequate implementation of cryptographic best practices.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The primary fix involves implementing proper certificate verification mechanisms that validate certificate chains against trusted certificate authorities, check certificate expiration dates, and ensure certificate integrity through proper cryptographic validation. Organizations should implement certificate pinning techniques that require specific certificates or certificate fingerprints rather than accepting any certificate from a server. Additionally, the application should incorporate robust error handling for certificate validation failures and implement proper logging of security events related to certificate verification. Security teams should also consider implementing network-level monitoring to detect anomalous certificate behavior and establish regular security assessments to identify similar vulnerabilities in other applications. The remediation process should follow established security frameworks such as those outlined in NIST SP 800-52 for certificate management and TLS implementation guidelines to ensure comprehensive protection against similar vulnerabilities in the future.