CVE-2014-7509 in A Very Short History of Japan
Summary
by MITRE
The A Very Short History of Japan (aka com.ireadercity.c51) application 3.0.2 for Android does not verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/09/2024
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2014-7509 affects the A Very Short History of Japan Android application version 3.0.2, representing a critical security flaw in the application's implementation of secure communication protocols. This issue stems from the application's failure to properly validate X.509 certificates during SSL/TLS connections, creating a significant attack vector for malicious actors who can exploit this weakness to compromise user data integrity. The vulnerability directly impacts the application's ability to establish trust with remote servers, fundamentally undermining the security assurances that SSL/TLS encryption is designed to provide.
The technical flaw manifests in the application's certificate verification process, where the software fails to perform proper validation of SSL certificates presented by servers. This omission allows attackers to present fraudulent certificates that appear legitimate to the application, enabling them to intercept and potentially modify communications between the mobile device and targeted servers. The vulnerability specifically relates to the absence of certificate chain validation, hostname verification, and trust anchor validation that are essential components of secure SSL/TLS implementation. According to CWE-295, this represents a weakness in certificate validation that directly enables man-in-the-middle attacks by failing to properly verify the authenticity of SSL certificates.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data interception, as it enables attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information that users might transmit through the application. Mobile applications that rely on secure communication channels for user data, financial transactions, or personal information are particularly vulnerable to exploitation. The attack scenario involves an attacker positioned between the user's device and the legitimate server, capable of presenting a malicious certificate that the application accepts without proper verification. This vulnerability aligns with ATT&CK technique T1041, where adversaries use man-in-the-middle techniques to intercept and manipulate communications. The consequences include potential exposure of user credentials, personal data, financial information, and other sensitive content that the application might handle during its operation.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require immediate implementation of proper certificate validation mechanisms within the application. Developers must ensure that SSL certificate verification includes complete certificate chain validation, hostname matching against the certificate's subject, and validation against trusted certificate authorities. The application should implement certificate pinning where appropriate to prevent the acceptance of fraudulent certificates even if they appear valid. Security patches should enforce strict certificate validation protocols that align with industry standards such as those specified in RFC 5280 for X.509 certificate validation. Organizations should also consider implementing network-level security controls including SSL inspection capabilities and monitoring for suspicious certificate behavior. The remediation process should involve comprehensive code review of all SSL/TLS implementation components and thorough testing of certificate validation logic to ensure that the application properly validates server certificates before establishing secure connections.