CVE-2014-7589 in Industrial
Summary
by MITRE
The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) Banking (aka com.icbc.android) application 2.40 for Android does not verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/12/2024
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2014-7589 affects the ICBC Banking application version 2.40 for Android devices, representing a critical security flaw in the mobile banking ecosystem. This issue stems from the application's failure to properly validate X.509 certificates during SSL/TLS communications, creating a significant attack surface that adversaries can exploit to compromise user data and financial transactions. The vulnerability specifically targets the certificate verification mechanism that should establish trust between the mobile banking client and the bank's secure servers, fundamentally undermining the cryptographic security measures designed to protect sensitive financial information.
The technical flaw manifests as a complete absence of certificate pinning or validation within the application's SSL implementation, allowing attackers to perform man-in-the-middle attacks by presenting fraudulent certificates that appear legitimate to the application. This weakness directly violates established security protocols and standards such as those defined in CWE-295, which addresses "Improper Certificate Validation," and aligns with ATT&CK technique T1041, which covers "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel" through compromised communication channels. The application's failure to implement proper certificate chain validation means that any attacker who can intercept network traffic can present a fake certificate signed by a trusted authority or create their own certificate authority, effectively bypassing the security layer that should protect against such attacks.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends far beyond simple data interception, as it enables attackers to gain access to sensitive financial information including account balances, transaction histories, and personal identification details. Mobile banking applications are particularly vulnerable to this class of attack because users often conduct transactions in public environments where network interception is feasible, and the application's lack of certificate verification removes any protection against such scenarios. This vulnerability could enable attackers to redirect users to fraudulent banking portals, steal login credentials, or manipulate transaction data in real-time, potentially leading to financial loss and identity theft. The attack vector is particularly dangerous because it requires no sophisticated tools or deep technical knowledge beyond basic network interception capabilities.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should focus on implementing proper certificate pinning mechanisms and ensuring that all SSL/TLS communications include rigorous certificate validation procedures. Security measures should include certificate chain validation with proper trust store management, implementation of certificate pinning to prevent certificate substitution attacks, and regular security audits of mobile applications to identify similar validation flaws. Organizations should follow industry standards such as those outlined in NIST SP 800-52 for certificate management and implement the ATT&CK framework's defensive techniques for securing mobile applications. The application should be updated to verify certificate signatures against trusted certificate authorities, implement certificate revocation checking, and ensure that any certificate presented by a server meets strict validation criteria before establishing secure communication channels. Additionally, network security monitoring should be enhanced to detect and alert on suspicious certificate exchanges that may indicate an active man-in-the-middle attack against the banking application.