CVE-2014-7593 in Mr Whippet - Yorkshire Ice
Summary
by MITRE
The Mr Whippet - Yorkshire Ice (aka com.appytimes.ice) application 1.1 for Android does not verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/12/2024
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2014-7593 affects the Mr Whippet - Yorkshire Ice Android application version 1.1, representing a critical security flaw in the application's implementation of secure communication protocols. This issue falls under the broader category of SSL/TLS certificate validation failures, which are fundamental to maintaining the integrity and confidentiality of data transmitted over network connections. The application's failure to properly verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers creates a significant attack surface that compromises the security posture of users interacting with the application.
The technical flaw manifests in the application's inability to perform proper certificate chain validation during SSL/TLS handshakes. When an Android application establishes a secure connection to a remote server, it should validate the server's X.509 certificate against a trusted certificate authority to ensure the authenticity of the server. In this case, the Mr Whippet application bypasses this critical validation step, allowing attackers to present fraudulent certificates that appear legitimate to the application. This vulnerability directly relates to CWE-295, which specifically addresses "Improper Certificate Validation," and represents a classic example of how weak cryptographic implementations can undermine security controls. The flaw enables what is commonly known as a man-in-the-middle attack scenario where an adversary can intercept and potentially modify communications between the mobile application and its backend services.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is substantial, as it exposes users to potential data theft and service impersonation attacks. Attackers can exploit this weakness to create fake server certificates that the application will accept without question, allowing them to eavesdrop on sensitive communications, capture user credentials, or inject malicious data into the application's network traffic. This is particularly concerning for an application that may handle user personal information, account credentials, or financial data, as the lack of certificate verification essentially removes the primary defense mechanism against network-based attacks. The vulnerability is consistent with ATT&CK technique T1046, which describes the use of network service scanning to identify vulnerable systems, and T1566, which covers the use of spearphishing to gain initial access to systems. The security implications extend beyond simple information disclosure, as the compromised application could serve as a foothold for more extensive attacks within a user's network environment.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require immediate attention from both developers and security administrators. Application developers should implement proper certificate pinning mechanisms, ensuring that the application only accepts certificates from specific trusted authorities or predetermined certificate fingerprints. The implementation should follow industry best practices for secure coding, including the use of Android's built-in certificate validation APIs and proper error handling for certificate validation failures. Security administrators should consider implementing network-based monitoring solutions to detect anomalous traffic patterns that might indicate exploitation attempts. Additionally, users should be advised to avoid using the application until proper security patches are deployed, and organizations should conduct comprehensive security assessments of their mobile applications to identify similar certificate validation issues. The fix should involve comprehensive testing of the SSL/TLS implementation to ensure that all certificate validation checks are properly enforced, and the application should be updated to use current cryptographic standards that align with NIST SP 800-52 guidelines for certificate management.