CVE-2014-7701 in DoNotTrackMe - Mobile Privacy
Summary
by MITRE
The DoNotTrackMe - Mobile Privacy (aka com.abine.dnt) application 1.1.8 for Android does not verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/15/2024
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2014-7701 affects the DoNotTrackMe - Mobile Privacy application version 1.1.8 for Android platforms, representing a critical security flaw in the application's SSL/TLS certificate validation mechanism. This vulnerability resides within the mobile privacy application's network communication stack, where the software fails to properly validate X.509 certificates presented by SSL servers during secure connections. The flaw creates a significant security gap that directly violates fundamental principles of secure communication protocols and mobile application security practices.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from the application's failure to perform proper certificate chain validation and trust verification processes. When the DoNotTrackMe application establishes secure connections to remote servers, it does not validate the presented X.509 certificates against trusted certificate authorities or perform necessary cryptographic checks that would normally occur during SSL/TLS handshakes. This omission allows malicious actors to intercept communications through man-in-the-middle attacks, where attackers can present fraudulent certificates that the application will accept as legitimate. The vulnerability specifically relates to the absence of certificate pinning mechanisms and proper trust store validation, which are essential components for maintaining secure communications in mobile applications.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data interception, as it enables attackers to obtain sensitive information from users of the privacy application. Since the application is designed to protect user privacy and track online activities, the vulnerability creates a paradox where the tool meant to secure user data becomes a vector for data theft. Attackers can exploit this weakness to capture user credentials, personal information, browsing patterns, and other sensitive data that flows through the application's network connections. The vulnerability undermines the fundamental security assumptions that users rely upon when installing privacy protection applications, potentially exposing users to identity theft, financial fraud, and comprehensive tracking of their online behavior.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-295, which specifically addresses "Improper Certificate Validation" in security protocols, and represents a clear violation of the secure coding practices outlined in industry standards for mobile application development. From an adversarial perspective, this flaw fits within the ATT&CK framework's technique T1041, which covers "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel" and T1566, which addresses "Phishing for Information", as attackers can leverage this vulnerability to establish covert data collection channels. The weakness also corresponds to the broader category of trust management failures in mobile security, where applications fail to properly validate the authenticity of network endpoints. Organizations implementing mobile security policies should consider this vulnerability as a critical indicator of inadequate secure communication practices within mobile applications, particularly those handling sensitive user data. Mitigation strategies must include proper certificate validation implementation, certificate pinning, and comprehensive security testing of mobile applications before deployment to ensure that privacy protection tools maintain their integrity and do not become attack vectors themselves.
The vulnerability demonstrates the critical importance of proper SSL/TLS implementation in mobile applications and highlights how even privacy-focused tools can become security risks when fundamental cryptographic validation processes are omitted. Security professionals should recognize this as a prime example of how application developers must rigorously test their secure communication implementations and adhere to established security frameworks and best practices.