CVE-2014-8309 in BusinessObjects
Summary
by MITRE
SAP BusinessObjects 4.0 and BusinessObjects XI (BOXI) R2 and 3.1 generates error messages for a failed logon attempt with different time delays depending on whether the user account exists, which allows remote attackers to enumerate valid usernames via SecEnterprise authentication requests to the Session web service.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 03/13/2019
SAP BusinessObjects platforms version 4.0 and BusinessObjects XI (BOXI) R2 and 3.1 contain a timing-based side-channel vulnerability in their authentication mechanism that exposes user account enumeration capabilities to remote attackers. This vulnerability specifically affects the SecEnterprise authentication requests processed through the Session web service, creating a distinguishable delay pattern in error message generation that varies based on whether the attempted username exists in the system. The flaw represents a classic timing attack vector where attackers can exploit the differential response times to determine valid user accounts without requiring direct authentication credentials. This vulnerability is categorized under CWE-203, which describes weaknesses related to the exposure of sensitive information through timing variations, and aligns with ATT&CK technique T1087.001 for account discovery through credential access methods.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from the inconsistent error handling within the authentication subsystem. When a user attempts to log in with an invalid username, the system generates a response that includes a specific delay pattern designed to obscure the exact nature of the authentication failure. However, when a valid username is provided but an incorrect password is submitted, the system introduces a different delay pattern that is measurable and predictable. This timing differential allows attackers to perform systematic username enumeration by measuring response times for authentication attempts against the Session web service. The vulnerability specifically impacts the SecEnterprise authentication protocol implementation, which is used for enterprise-level authentication within SAP BusinessObjects environments.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple user enumeration, as it provides attackers with a foundational foothold for more sophisticated attacks within SAP BusinessObjects environments. Once valid usernames are identified through this timing-based enumeration, attackers can proceed with password spraying, brute force attempts, or credential stuffing attacks against the discovered accounts. The vulnerability affects organizations that rely on SAP BusinessObjects for business intelligence and reporting, potentially exposing sensitive data and business-critical applications to unauthorized access. Organizations with weak password policies or reused credentials face particularly severe consequences, as the enumeration process can quickly identify high-value accounts within the system.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require both immediate and long-term approaches to address the timing inconsistencies in the authentication response handling. Organizations should implement rate limiting and account lockout mechanisms to prevent automated enumeration attempts, while also applying SAP security notes and patches that address the specific timing variations in error message generation. The recommended solution involves modifying the Session web service to provide consistent response times regardless of whether the username exists in the system, ensuring that authentication failures generate identical delay patterns for all account attempts. Additionally, organizations should implement network-level controls such as intrusion detection systems that can monitor for suspicious authentication patterns and establish proper access controls to limit exposure of the Session web service to untrusted networks. Security monitoring should include detection of timing-based attacks and implementation of automated response mechanisms to block suspicious authentication attempts.