CVE-2015-1999 in Security QRadar Incident Forensics
Summary
by MITRE
IBM Security QRadar Incident Forensics 7.2.x before 7.2.5 Patch 5 places session IDs in https URLs, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information by reading (1) web-server access logs, (2) web-server Referer logs, or (3) the browser history.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 03/08/2018
IBM Security QRadar Incident Forensics version 7.2.x prior to 7.2.5 Patch 5 contains a critical information exposure vulnerability where session identifiers are embedded within HTTPS URLs. This design flaw fundamentally undermines the security of the authentication mechanism by making session tokens accessible through multiple attack vectors that are commonly logged or transmitted during normal web browsing operations. The vulnerability stems from the improper handling of session management within the application's URL structure, where session IDs are passed as URL parameters rather than being securely stored in HTTP headers or cookies. This weakness directly maps to CWE-200, which addresses information exposure through improper handling of sensitive data, and represents a significant deviation from secure coding practices that recommend keeping session identifiers out of URL parameters to prevent accidental exposure.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple information disclosure, as it creates multiple attack surfaces that threat actors can exploit through various means. Attackers can obtain session IDs from web server access logs that typically contain full URL information including query parameters, or from Referer headers that browsers automatically send when navigating between pages. Additionally, the session identifiers become accessible through browser history mechanisms, which means that even if users clear their cookies, the session tokens remain exposed in browser history. This vulnerability particularly affects environments where QRadar is deployed in shared or public computing environments, as session tokens can be extracted from any system that logs web traffic or maintains browser history records. The exposure occurs regardless of the HTTPS encryption being in place, as the session ID is transmitted in the URL parameters where it becomes visible to any system that processes or logs these URLs.
The security implications of this vulnerability are severe and align with ATT&CK technique T1566, which covers the use of phishing attacks and credential theft through various information gathering methods. Attackers can leverage this vulnerability to perform session hijacking attacks, where they intercept and reuse valid session identifiers to gain unauthorized access to user accounts and sensitive forensic data within the QRadar system. This creates a pathway for attackers to access incident forensics information, potentially compromising the integrity of security investigations and exposing sensitive organizational data. The vulnerability also impacts the principle of least privilege, as unauthorized users can gain access to resources that should be restricted to authorized personnel only. Organizations using this software are particularly vulnerable in environments where multiple users share systems or where logging mechanisms are not properly configured to mask sensitive URL parameters. The attack vector is particularly dangerous because it requires no specialized tools or techniques beyond standard log analysis and browser history examination, making it accessible to a wide range of threat actors.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should include immediate deployment of IBM Security QRadar Incident Forensics 7.2.5 Patch 5, which addresses the specific session ID exposure issue through proper session management implementation. Organizations should also implement URL parameter filtering at the web server level to prevent session identifiers from being logged in access logs or other system records. Network administrators should configure logging systems to mask or remove session tokens from URL parameters before they are stored in log files. Additional defensive measures include implementing secure session management practices such as using HTTP-only and secure cookies for session storage, enabling proper session timeout mechanisms, and conducting regular security audits of web application configurations. Organizations should also consider implementing network monitoring solutions that can detect and alert on suspicious URL patterns containing session identifiers, as well as establishing proper access controls and monitoring procedures for forensic data access. The vulnerability serves as a reminder of the critical importance of secure session management in web applications and the need for comprehensive security testing that includes examination of URL parameter handling and logging practices.