CVE-2015-2896 in Uptime Infrastructure Monitor
Summary
by MITRE
The up.time client in Idera Uptime Infrastructure Monitor through 7.6 allows remote attackers to obtain potentially sensitive version, OS, process, and event-log information via a command.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/06/2024
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2015-2896 affects the up time client component within Idera Uptime Infrastructure Monitor version 7.6 and earlier. This security flaw represents a significant information disclosure weakness that exposes system metadata to remote attackers without requiring authentication. The up time client serves as a monitoring agent that collects and reports system information back to the central monitoring server, making it a critical component in the infrastructure monitoring ecosystem. When exploited, this vulnerability enables adversaries to gather detailed system intelligence that could inform subsequent attack phases.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from insufficient input validation and access control mechanisms within the up time client's command processing functionality. Attackers can craft specific commands that trigger the client to return version information, operating system details, running processes, and event log entries. This occurs because the client fails to properly authenticate or authorize command execution requests, allowing any remote party to query these sensitive system attributes through the standard communication channels. The flaw essentially provides a backdoor interface that exposes system fingerprinting data to unauthorized parties.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple information gathering as it significantly reduces the security posture of monitored systems. The disclosed information includes version numbers that may reveal known vulnerabilities in specific software releases, operating system details that help attackers tailor their exploitation strategies, process listings that indicate running services and potential attack surfaces, and event logs that provide insights into system behavior and security events. This intelligence gathering capability aligns with ATT&CK technique T1082 (System Information Discovery) and T1069 (Permission Groups Discovery) under the reconnaissance phase of cyber operations. Organizations may face increased risk of targeted attacks once attackers have compiled this system intelligence, particularly if the disclosed information reveals outdated software versions or misconfigured services.
The vulnerability demonstrates a clear violation of the principle of least privilege and proper access control as defined in CWE-284. The up time client should only respond to authenticated commands from legitimate monitoring servers rather than exposing system information to any remote party. This flaw creates a persistent information leak that could be exploited over time to build comprehensive profiles of monitored systems, potentially enabling attackers to identify specific vulnerabilities, weak points in the infrastructure, and operational patterns that could be exploited in more sophisticated attacks. Organizations using Idera Uptime Infrastructure Monitor should immediately implement mitigations including network segmentation, firewall rules to restrict access to monitoring ports, and application-level authentication controls to prevent unauthorized information disclosure.
Mitigation strategies should focus on implementing network-level controls to restrict access to the up time client communication ports and ensuring that only trusted monitoring servers can communicate with client agents. The affected software vendor should be consulted for official patches or updates that address the authentication bypass issue. Organizations should also implement monitoring for unusual command patterns or unauthorized access attempts to the monitoring infrastructure. The vulnerability highlights the importance of securing not just the primary application but also the supporting agents and clients that form the distributed monitoring architecture, as these components often become attack vectors when not properly secured against unauthorized access. This incident underscores the critical need for comprehensive security testing of monitoring agents and the implementation of proper access controls throughout the entire infrastructure monitoring ecosystem.