CVE-2015-5271 in Object Storage
Summary
by MITRE
The TripleO Heat templates (tripleo-heat-templates) does not properly order the Identity Service (keystone) before the OpenStack Object Storage (Swift) staticweb middleware in the swiftproxy pipeline when the staticweb middleware is enabled, which might allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from private containers via unspecified vectors.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/25/2022
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2015-5271 affects the TripleO Heat templates used in OpenStack deployments, specifically addressing a critical ordering issue within the Swift proxy middleware pipeline configuration. This flaw exists within the tripleo-heat-templates package which serves as the primary orchestration mechanism for deploying OpenStack environments through Heat orchestration service. The vulnerability stems from improper sequence configuration where the Identity Service (keystone) authentication middleware is not correctly positioned before the Swift staticweb middleware in the proxy pipeline, creating a potential security gap that could be exploited by remote attackers.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability involves the incorrect ordering of middleware components within the Swift proxy server configuration. When the staticweb middleware is enabled, the authentication layer provided by keystone should execute before the staticweb functionality to ensure proper access control and authorization checks. However, due to the flawed template configuration, the authentication middleware may not be invoked prior to staticweb processing, allowing unauthorized access to private container data. This misconfiguration creates a scenario where the middleware pipeline executes in an insecure sequence that bypasses proper authentication mechanisms.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple information disclosure, as it represents a fundamental breakdown in the security architecture of OpenStack deployments using TripleO orchestration. Remote attackers could potentially exploit this weakness to access private Swift containers that should normally be restricted to authorized users only, leading to unauthorized data access and potential compromise of sensitive information stored within the OpenStack environment. The unspecified vectors mentioned in the description suggest that multiple attack paths may exist depending on the specific deployment configurations and network conditions.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-691, which addresses insufficient control flow management, specifically concerning the improper ordering of security-relevant operations within middleware pipelines. The issue also relates to ATT&CK technique T1078 which covers valid accounts and T1566 which covers phishing, as unauthorized access to private containers could provide attackers with additional credentials or sensitive data that could be used for further exploitation. Organizations deploying OpenStack environments using TripleO orchestration are particularly vulnerable to this issue, as the templates are widely used for production deployments.
Mitigation strategies should focus on correcting the middleware pipeline ordering within the TripleO Heat templates to ensure keystone authentication executes before staticweb middleware functionality. This requires updating the template configurations to explicitly define the correct middleware sequence in the swift proxy server configuration files. Administrators should also implement proper monitoring and logging of Swift proxy server access patterns to detect potential exploitation attempts. Additionally, regular updates and patches to the tripleo-heat-templates package should be applied to ensure that known vulnerabilities are addressed. Organizations should conduct security assessments of their OpenStack deployments to verify that the middleware ordering has been corrected and that proper authentication mechanisms are functioning as intended.