CVE-2015-6569 in Floodlight Controller
Summary
by MITRE
Race condition in the LoadBalancer module in the Atlassian Floodlight Controller before 1.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and thread crash) via a state manipulation attack.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 02/08/2023
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2015-6569 represents a critical race condition flaw within the LoadBalancer module of the Atlassian Floodlight Controller software. This issue affects versions prior to 1.2 and demonstrates a fundamental concurrency problem that can be exploited by remote attackers to disrupt service availability. The Floodlight Controller serves as a software-defined networking (SDN) controller that manages network switches and routers, making it a critical component in modern network infrastructure deployments. The race condition occurs during the processing of network state changes and load balancing operations, creating a window where the system's internal state becomes inconsistent and potentially leads to system instability.
The technical exploitation of this vulnerability involves manipulating the network state in a manner that triggers a race condition between multiple threads or processes within the LoadBalancer module. When concurrent operations attempt to access shared resources without proper synchronization mechanisms, the system can enter an inconsistent state where pointers become invalid or null references are dereferenced. This particular flaw manifests as a NULL pointer dereference that causes the affected thread to crash, ultimately leading to a complete denial of service condition for the controller service. The vulnerability's impact is amplified by the fact that it can be triggered remotely without requiring authentication, making it particularly dangerous in network environments where the controller is exposed to untrusted networks.
From an operational perspective, the consequences of this vulnerability extend beyond simple service disruption to potentially compromise the entire network infrastructure managed by the Floodlight Controller. The crash of threads responsible for load balancing and state management can result in network partitions, packet loss, and complete service outages for applications relying on the SDN controller for traffic management. Network administrators may experience difficulties in maintaining consistent network policies and may face challenges in recovering from the service disruption. The vulnerability aligns with CWE-362, which categorizes race conditions as a common class of concurrency flaws that can lead to unpredictable system behavior and security implications. Organizations using Floodlight Controller versions prior to 1.2 are particularly vulnerable as the flaw represents a design weakness that allows attackers to manipulate the controller's internal state through legitimate network operations.
The attack surface for this vulnerability is significant given the distributed nature of SDN controllers and their exposure to various network endpoints. Attackers can leverage this flaw by crafting specific network state manipulation requests that trigger the race condition during concurrent load balancing operations. The exploitation process typically involves sending carefully constructed packets or state update messages that cause the controller to process multiple operations simultaneously, creating the conditions necessary for the race condition to occur. Mitigation strategies should include immediate deployment of the patched version 1.2 or later, which addresses the synchronization issues within the LoadBalancer module. Additionally, network segmentation and access control measures can help limit the exposure of the controller to untrusted networks, while monitoring systems should be implemented to detect unusual thread behavior or service disruptions that may indicate exploitation attempts. The vulnerability demonstrates the importance of proper concurrency control in network infrastructure software and highlights the need for comprehensive testing of multi-threaded components in security-critical systems. Organizations should also consider implementing redundancy mechanisms and automated failover procedures to minimize the impact of such service disruptions while awaiting security patches.