CVE-2016-10370 in OTA Updater
Summary
by MITRE
An issue was discovered on OnePlus devices such as the 3T. The OnePlus OTA Updater pushes the signed-OTA image over HTTP without TLS. While it does not allow for installation of arbitrary OTAs (due to the digital signature), it unnecessarily increases the attack surface, and allows for remote exploitation of other vulnerabilities such as CVE-2017-5948, CVE-2017-8850, and CVE-2017-8851.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 12/23/2020
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2016-10370 represents a critical security flaw in OnePlus devices, specifically affecting models such as the 3T. This issue stems from the OnePlus OTA Updater implementation which transmits signed over-the-air firmware images using unencrypted HTTP protocols instead of secure HTTPS connections. While the system maintains digital signature verification to prevent installation of malicious firmware, the absence of Transport Layer Security creates an exploitable attack surface that significantly weakens the overall security posture of these devices.
The technical flaw manifests in the network transmission layer where sensitive firmware updates are delivered without encryption, making them susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks and network-level interference. This vulnerability directly violates security best practices outlined in industry standards such as CWE-319, which specifically addresses the exposure of sensitive information through improper use of network protocols. The lack of TLS encryption means that attackers can intercept, modify, or inject malicious content into the OTA update process, even though the digital signatures provide protection against unauthorized firmware installation.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond the immediate security concerns, as it creates opportunities for exploitation of additional vulnerabilities within the device ecosystem. Security researchers have identified that this weakness enables remote exploitation of related vulnerabilities including CVE-2017-5948, CVE-2017-8850, and CVE-2017-8851, which collectively represent a broader attack surface that could compromise device integrity and user data. This chaining of vulnerabilities demonstrates how a single implementation flaw can amplify the effectiveness of other security weaknesses, creating a more dangerous threat landscape for end users.
From a threat modeling perspective, this vulnerability aligns with ATT&CK techniques that focus on initial access and privilege escalation through network-based attacks. The absence of TLS encryption provides attackers with opportunities to perform traffic interception attacks, potentially leading to more severe consequences when combined with other device-specific vulnerabilities. Organizations and users should recognize that while digital signatures offer protection against certain types of attacks, they cannot compensate for fundamental network security failures that expose sensitive update mechanisms to interception and manipulation.
Recommended mitigations for this vulnerability include implementing mandatory TLS encryption for all OTA update communications, ensuring that devices reject any unsigned or unencrypted update requests, and conducting thorough security audits of all network-based update mechanisms. Additionally, device manufacturers should adopt zero-trust security models that validate all network communications regardless of their apparent source or content. The vulnerability serves as a reminder that security controls must be comprehensive and layered, as relying solely on digital signatures without proper network encryption creates dangerous gaps in overall device security that attackers can exploit to compromise system integrity and user privacy.