CVE-2016-2354 in Vehicle Monitors BlueDriver
Summary
by MITRE
The Bluetooth functionality in Lemur Vehicle Monitors BlueDriver before 2016-04-07 supports unrestricted pairing without a PIN, which allows remote attackers to send arbitrary CAN commands by leveraging access to a device inside or adjacent to the vehicle, as demonstrated by a CAN command to disrupt braking or steering.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/31/2024
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2016-2354 represents a critical security flaw in the Bluetooth implementation of Lemur Vehicle Monitors BlueDriver software versions prior to 2016-04-07. This weakness specifically targets the vehicle's wireless communication protocols and exposes automotive systems to unauthorized remote access. The vulnerability stems from the absence of proper authentication mechanisms during the Bluetooth pairing process, creating a significant attack surface that adversaries can exploit to gain control over vehicle systems. The flaw operates at the intersection of automotive cybersecurity and wireless communication security, where the lack of PIN verification creates an open pathway for malicious actors to establish connections with vehicle control systems.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability lies in the Bluetooth pairing mechanism that fails to enforce mandatory authentication requirements. When a device attempts to pair with the vehicle's Bluetooth system, the absence of a PIN code requirement allows any nearby device to establish a connection without proper verification. This design flaw enables attackers to leverage their proximity to the vehicle to gain access to the vehicle's Controller Area Network (CAN) bus interface. The CAN bus serves as the primary communication backbone for vehicle systems, controlling critical functions such as braking, steering, and engine operations. Once an attacker establishes this unauthorized connection, they can transmit arbitrary CAN commands directly to the vehicle's electronic control units, effectively bypassing normal security controls and operational boundaries.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple unauthorized access, as it enables attackers to execute potentially dangerous commands that could compromise vehicle safety and security. The demonstrated attack scenario involves sending CAN commands to disrupt braking or steering functions, which could lead to serious safety hazards including loss of vehicle control, accidents, or even fatalities. This vulnerability fundamentally undermines the security model of vehicle electronic systems, where physical proximity should not equate to system control authority. The threat landscape for this vulnerability includes both opportunistic attackers who might exploit it for malicious purposes and more sophisticated threat actors who could use it as part of larger attack campaigns targeting critical infrastructure. The attack vector is particularly concerning because it requires minimal technical expertise to execute, making it accessible to a wide range of threat actors.
The vulnerability aligns with several cybersecurity standards and frameworks, including CWE-312 (Sensitive Data Exposure) and CWE-311 (Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data), as it exposes vehicle communication channels without proper authentication. From an ATT&CK framework perspective, this vulnerability maps to techniques involving initial access through wireless protocols and privilege escalation through system control interfaces. The remediation approach must address both the immediate pairing mechanism flaw and the broader security architecture of vehicle communication systems. Organizations should implement mandatory PIN-based pairing requirements, establish secure communication channels with proper encryption, and deploy network segmentation to isolate critical vehicle systems. Additionally, regular security updates and vulnerability assessments should be mandated for all automotive software components to prevent similar issues from emerging in the future. The incident highlights the growing need for robust security standards in automotive systems, particularly as vehicles become increasingly connected and dependent on wireless communication protocols for their operation and safety functions.