CVE-2016-4863 in FlashAir
Summary
by MITRE
The Toshiba FlashAir SD-WD/WC series Class 6 model with firmware version 1.00.04 and later, FlashAir SD-WD/WC series Class 10 model W-02 with firmware version 2.00.02 and later, FlashAir SD-WE series Class 10 model W-03, FlashAir Class 6 model with firmware version 1.00.04 and later, FlashAir II Class 10 model W-02 series with firmware version 2.00.02 and later, FlashAir III Class 10 model W-03 series, FlashAir Class 6 model with firmware version 1.00.04 and later, FlashAir W-02 series Class 10 model with firmware version 2.00.02 and later, FlashAir W-03 series Class 10 model does not require authentication on accepting a connection from STA side LAN when "Internet pass-thru Mode" is enabled, which allows attackers with access to STA side LAN can obtain files or data.
If you want to get best quality of vulnerability data, you may have to visit VulDB.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 12/25/2020
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2016-4863 affects Toshiba FlashAir SD card series devices operating under specific firmware versions, creating a critical security flaw in network access control mechanisms. These devices are designed to function as wireless storage solutions, enabling data transfer between connected devices through wireless local area networks. The vulnerability specifically manifests when the "Internet pass-thru Mode" is enabled, a configuration that allows the device to act as a network bridge for internet traffic. This feature, while intended to facilitate seamless connectivity, introduces a significant security weakness that undermines the device's authentication requirements.
The technical flaw resides in the device's failure to properly enforce authentication protocols when establishing connections from the Station (STA) side of the local area network. According to CWE-305 authentication bypass vulnerability classification, this represents a fundamental failure in access control implementation where the system does not adequately verify the identity of connecting devices before granting network access. The flaw operates at the network protocol level, specifically within the wireless access point functionality that governs how devices connect and communicate through the FlashAir device's interface. When the internet pass-thru mode is active, the device's wireless access point component fails to require proper authentication credentials from devices attempting to establish connections, creating an open pathway for unauthorized network access.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data exposure, representing a comprehensive breach of network security principles that aligns with ATT&CK technique T1071.004 for application layer protocol usage. An attacker positioned within the same local area network as the vulnerable FlashAir device can exploit this weakness to gain unauthorized access to stored files and data without requiring any authentication credentials. This scenario creates multiple attack vectors including potential data exfiltration, unauthorized file access, and possible lateral movement within network environments where these devices are deployed. The vulnerability affects multiple device models across different FlashAir series, indicating a systemic issue within the firmware implementation rather than an isolated component failure. The affected firmware versions suggest that this was not a newly introduced flaw but rather a persistent issue that remained unresolved through multiple firmware releases, indicating inadequate security testing or oversight during development cycles.
Security implications of this vulnerability are particularly concerning given the widespread deployment of FlashAir devices in both consumer and enterprise environments where they may serve as network access points for various devices. The lack of authentication requirements creates an environment where any device on the local network can potentially access the FlashAir device's stored data, including sensitive information that may be stored on the device. This vulnerability directly violates fundamental network security principles and could enable attackers to perform reconnaissance activities, access confidential data, or potentially use the device as a pivot point for further network exploration. The attack surface is expanded by the fact that these devices are often deployed in locations where physical access is possible, making the network-level vulnerability even more dangerous. Mitigation strategies should focus on disabling the internet pass-thru mode when not required, implementing network segmentation to isolate these devices, and ensuring firmware updates are applied to address the authentication bypass issue. Organizations should also consider network monitoring solutions to detect unusual access patterns that may indicate exploitation attempts, while recognizing that the fundamental flaw in authentication implementation requires firmware-level remediation to provide complete protection.