CVE-2017-11131 in StashCat
Summary
by MITRE
An issue was discovered in heinekingmedia StashCat through 1.7.5 for Android, through 0.0.80w for Web, and through 0.0.86 for Desktop. For authentication, the user password is hashed directly with SHA-512 without a salt or another key-derivation mechanism to enable a secure secret for authentication. Moreover, only the first 32 bytes of the hash are used. This allows for easy dictionary and rainbow-table attacks if an attacker has access to the password hash.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/02/2019
The vulnerability identified in heinekingmedia StashCat across its mobile, web, and desktop implementations represents a critical cryptographic flaw that fundamentally undermines the security of user authentication mechanisms. This weakness stems from the application's improper handling of password hashing, where user credentials are processed through SHA-512 algorithm without the essential security component of salting. The absence of salt means that identical passwords across different user accounts produce identical hash values, creating predictable patterns that adversaries can exploit. The vulnerability aligns with CWE-916, which specifically addresses the use of weak or broken cryptographic algorithms in authentication systems, and falls under the broader category of improper cryptographic hashing practices that have been consistently flagged as high-risk security issues in industry standards.
The technical implementation of this flaw demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of cryptographic best practices in password storage. When passwords are hashed directly with SHA-512 without salting, the resulting hash becomes vulnerable to precomputation attacks such as rainbow table attacks and dictionary attacks. The additional weakness of truncating the hash to only 32 bytes further reduces the entropy and security of the authentication mechanism, making it significantly easier for attackers to reverse-engineer passwords through brute force or lookup methods. This truncation reduces the effective security margin and creates a more predictable attack surface that violates established security protocols for password storage as outlined in NIST Special Publication 800-63B and other cryptographic standards. The combination of unsalted hashing and truncation creates a particularly dangerous scenario where even relatively simple passwords can be cracked within reasonable timeframes using readily available computational resources.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond individual user accounts to potentially compromise entire user bases within the StashCat ecosystem. Attackers who gain access to the password hash database can immediately begin conducting dictionary attacks against the stored credentials, with success rates significantly higher than would be expected with properly salted hashes. The lack of key derivation mechanisms means that attackers can leverage existing computational infrastructure and precomputed hash tables to rapidly identify user passwords, particularly affecting users who employ common or easily guessable passwords. This vulnerability creates a persistent threat that remains viable even if the initial breach is discovered and mitigated, as previously compromised credentials remain vulnerable to exploitation. The impact is further amplified by the fact that this flaw affects multiple platform implementations, suggesting a systemic approach to authentication that could compromise user security across all StashCat applications simultaneously.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements to the authentication system. The primary requirement involves implementing proper password hashing with strong salt generation and key derivation functions such as PBKDF2, bcrypt, or scrypt, which are specifically designed to resist dictionary and rainbow table attacks. The implementation should ensure that each password is hashed with a unique, randomly generated salt and that the resulting hash maintains full entropy without unnecessary truncation. Organizations should also implement additional security measures including account lockout mechanisms, multi-factor authentication, and regular security audits to prevent exploitation of compromised credentials. The remediation process should follow established security frameworks such as those defined in the MITRE ATT&CK framework for credential access techniques, ensuring that the solution addresses not only the immediate cryptographic weakness but also strengthens the overall security posture of the application ecosystem.