CVE-2017-12306 in Spark Board
Summary
by MITRE
A vulnerability in the upgrade process of Cisco Spark Board could allow an authenticated, local attacker to install an unverified upgrade package, aka Signature Verification Bypass. The vulnerability is due to insufficient upgrade package validation. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by providing the upgrade process with an upgrade package that the attacker controls. An exploit could allow the attacker to install custom firmware to the Spark Board. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvf84502.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 01/24/2021
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2017-12306 resides within the upgrade mechanism of Cisco Spark Board devices, representing a critical security flaw that undermines the integrity of the firmware update process. This weakness specifically targets the signature verification procedures that should validate the authenticity and integrity of upgrade packages before installation. The vulnerability stems from inadequate validation controls that fail to properly authenticate upgrade payloads, creating an exploitable condition that allows malicious actors to bypass essential security checks. The affected Cisco Spark Board systems are designed for collaborative environments and video conferencing, making them attractive targets for adversaries seeking persistent access to enterprise networks through firmware-level compromise.
The technical exploitation of this vulnerability occurs through a straightforward yet dangerous attack vector where an authenticated local attacker can manipulate the upgrade process by supplying a custom upgrade package that the system accepts without proper verification. This signature verification bypass enables attackers to install malicious firmware modifications that can persist across system reboots and remain undetected by standard security monitoring mechanisms. The flaw represents a failure in the software supply chain security model, where the system's trust model is compromised during the update phase rather than during initial system operation. The vulnerability is classified under CWE-310 as "Cryptographic Issues" and specifically relates to "Weak Cryptographic Hash" or "Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity" within the context of firmware integrity protection.
Operationally, this vulnerability presents significant risks to enterprise security infrastructure, as it allows attackers with local access to potentially gain root-level control over Spark Board devices and subsequently use them as launch points for broader network infiltration. The compromised devices could serve as persistent backdoors, enabling attackers to monitor communications, exfiltrate data, or establish command and control channels. The impact extends beyond individual device compromise to potential network-wide consequences, particularly in environments where Spark Boards are integrated with corporate networks and connected to sensitive infrastructure. Attackers could leverage this vulnerability to establish long-term presence within organizations, making detection and remediation more challenging due to the firmware-level persistence of the compromise.
Organizations should implement immediate mitigations including disabling unnecessary local access to Spark Board devices, enforcing strict access controls, and monitoring for unauthorized upgrade activities. Network segmentation and endpoint detection systems should be deployed to detect anomalous upgrade behavior or unexpected firmware modifications. Cisco has addressed this vulnerability through software updates that strengthen the signature verification process and implement proper cryptographic validation of upgrade packages. Regular security assessments should include verification of firmware integrity and proper update management procedures. The vulnerability highlights the importance of maintaining robust security controls throughout the entire software lifecycle, particularly during update and patch management phases where attackers often seek to exploit trust relationships and validation weaknesses. Implementation of principles from the NIST Cybersecurity Framework and MITRE ATT&CK framework should emphasize the protection of update mechanisms and the integrity of system components during maintenance operations.