CVE-2017-12440 in Ocata
Summary
by MITRE
Aodh as packaged in Openstack Ocata and Newton before change-ID I8fd11a7f9fe3c0ea5f9843a89686ac06713b7851 and before Pike-rc1 does not verify that trust IDs belong to the user when creating alarm action with the scheme trust+http, which allows remote authenticated users with knowledge of trust IDs where Aodh is the trustee to obtain a Keystone token and perform unspecified authenticated actions by adding an alarm action with the scheme trust+http, and providing a trust id where Aodh is the trustee.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 12/16/2022
The vulnerability described in CVE-2017-12440 affects the Aodh monitoring service within OpenStack deployments, specifically in versions prior to the fix introduced by change-ID I8fd11a7f9fe3c0ea5f9843a89686ac06713b7851 and before Pike-rc1 releases. This issue represents a critical authorization flaw that undermines the security model of OpenStack's monitoring infrastructure, particularly when utilizing the trust+http scheme for alarm actions. The vulnerability manifests when Aodh fails to validate that trust IDs belong to the authenticated user attempting to create alarm actions, creating a significant privilege escalation vector.
The technical flaw stems from insufficient validation of trust identifiers within the trust+http scheme implementation. When users create alarm actions using this scheme, the system should verify that the provided trust ID corresponds to the authenticated user's identity and that Aodh itself serves as the trustee for that trust relationship. However, the absence of this validation check allows malicious actors who possess valid trust IDs where Aodh acts as the trustee to bypass normal authentication procedures. This validation failure creates a direct path for unauthorized token acquisition and subsequent authenticated actions within the OpenStack environment.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple privilege escalation to encompass potential data compromise and service disruption within OpenStack deployments. An authenticated attacker with knowledge of valid trust IDs can leverage this weakness to obtain Keystone tokens and perform actions that should be restricted to authorized users. This capability enables attackers to manipulate monitoring configurations, potentially leading to false alarm generation, data exfiltration through monitoring hooks, or even service denial by altering critical alarm thresholds and action parameters. The vulnerability particularly affects environments where trust relationships are frequently used for service-to-service authentication and monitoring integration.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-285, which addresses improper authorization in authentication mechanisms, and represents a classic case of insufficient input validation and trust verification. From an ATT&CK framework perspective, the issue maps to privilege escalation techniques where attackers leverage existing trust relationships to gain elevated access rights. The threat actor profile suggests an authenticated user with knowledge of trust relationships, which could include legitimate service accounts or users who have previously established trust relationships within the OpenStack environment. Organizations should implement immediate mitigations including applying the relevant OpenStack patches, enforcing stricter validation of trust identifiers, and implementing network segmentation to limit access to monitoring services. Additionally, regular audit of trust relationships and monitoring for unusual alarm action creation patterns should be established as part of security operations procedures to detect potential exploitation attempts.