CVE-2017-13718 in Station
Summary
by MITRE
The HTTP API supported by Starry Station (aka Starry Router) allows brute forcing the PIN setup by the user on the device, and this allows an attacker to change the Wi-Fi settings and PIN, as well as port forward and expose any internal device's port to the Internet. It was identified that the device uses custom Python code called "rodman" that allows the mobile appication to interact with the device. The APIs that are a part of this rodman Python file allow the mobile application to interact with the device using a secret, which is a uuid4 based session identifier generated by the device the first time it is set up. However, in some cases, these APIs can also use a security code. This security code is nothing but the PIN number set by the user to interact with the device when using the touch interface on the router. This allows an attacker on the Internet to interact with the router's HTTP interface when a user navigates to the attacker's website, and brute force the credentials. Also, since the device's server sets the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header to "*", an attacker can easily interact with the JSON payload returned by the device and steal sensitive information about the device.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/03/2023
The vulnerability described in CVE-2017-13718 represents a critical security flaw in Starry Station routers that exposes users to remote exploitation through improper authentication mechanisms and insecure API design. This device operates with a custom Python framework named "rodman" that facilitates communication between the mobile application and the router's HTTP interface. The core issue stems from the router's implementation of session management and authentication protocols that fail to adequately protect against credential guessing attacks. The device generates a UUID4-based session identifier during initial setup, but this mechanism can be bypassed when the security code, which is the user-configured PIN, is used for API authentication. This dual authentication approach creates a significant attack surface since the PIN serves as both a touch interface security mechanism and an API credential, making it vulnerable to systematic brute force attempts.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends far beyond simple credential theft, as successful exploitation allows attackers to completely compromise the router's configuration and network security. An attacker who successfully brute forces the PIN can modify Wi-Fi settings, change the PIN itself, and establish port forwarding rules that expose internal network devices to internet-based attacks. This capability directly maps to attack patterns described in the MITRE ATT&CK framework under T1071.004 for Application Layer Protocol: DNS and T1082 for System Information Discovery, as attackers can enumerate and manipulate network services. The vulnerability also enables persistent access to internal network resources, potentially allowing lateral movement and data exfiltration from connected devices within the local network.
The security implications are compounded by the router's improper HTTP header configuration that sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin to "*", creating a Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) vulnerability. This misconfiguration allows malicious web pages to make authenticated requests to the router's API without proper origin validation, enabling attackers to steal sensitive information through JSON responses. The combination of weak PIN brute force protection and insecure CORS implementation creates a perfect storm for unauthorized access, as documented in CWE-346 (Origin Validation Error) and CWE-287 (Improper Authentication). The threat landscape for such vulnerabilities aligns with ATT&CK techniques involving credential access through T1110 (Brute Force) and privilege escalation via T1068 (Local Potentially Vulnerable Services), making this a particularly dangerous vulnerability for home and small office network environments where users may not be security-savvy.
Mitigation strategies should focus on implementing proper rate limiting and account lockout mechanisms to prevent brute force attacks against the PIN, while also addressing the CORS misconfiguration by restricting the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header to specific trusted domains. Network segmentation and firewall rules should be implemented to limit external access to the router's administrative interfaces, and users should be educated about the importance of setting strong, unique PINs. The device manufacturer should update the rodman framework to implement proper session management with time-based expiration and implement multi-factor authentication for administrative access. Additionally, regular security audits of custom code implementations should be conducted to identify similar vulnerabilities in other proprietary software components that may be exposed to similar attack vectors.