CVE-2017-14460 in Parity Ethereum Client
Summary
by MITRE
An exploitable overly permissive cross-domain (CORS) whitelist vulnerability exists in JSON-RPC of Parity Ethereum client version 1.7.8. An automatically sent JSON object to JSON-RPC endpoint can trigger this vulnerability. A victim needs to visit a malicious website to trigger this vulnerability.
If you want to get best quality of vulnerability data, you may have to visit VulDB.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 02/02/2023
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2017-14460 represents a critical security flaw in the Parity Ethereum client version 1.7.8 that stems from an overly permissive cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) configuration. This weakness exists within the JSON-RPC endpoint implementation and allows unauthorized domains to access sensitive functionality without proper authentication or authorization checks. The vulnerability manifests when the client processes JSON-RPC requests that include automatically sent JSON objects, creating a scenario where malicious actors can exploit the relaxed CORS policy to gain unauthorized access to the Ethereum node's RPC interface. The attack vector requires user interaction through visiting a malicious website, making it a client-side exploitation technique that leverages the browser's cross-origin capabilities to bypass security boundaries.
The technical root cause of this vulnerability aligns with CWE-622, which describes improper validation of CORS headers, and specifically demonstrates how overly permissive CORS policies can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive resources. The flaw occurs because the Parity client's JSON-RPC endpoint fails to properly validate the origin of incoming requests, allowing any domain to submit RPC commands through the CORS mechanism. This creates a dangerous situation where legitimate RPC functions become accessible to malicious actors who can execute arbitrary commands on the Ethereum node. The vulnerability exploits the inherent trust model of CORS where browsers automatically send origin headers, but the server fails to validate these headers against an appropriate whitelist of trusted domains.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple information disclosure to encompass full compromise of the Ethereum node's functionality. An attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability can perform any action that the node's RPC interface permits, including but not limited to sending transactions, querying wallet balances, accessing private keys, and potentially controlling the entire node's operations. The attack requires only that a user visits a malicious website, making it particularly dangerous as it operates entirely within the user's browser context without requiring any additional software installation or complex exploitation techniques. This makes the vulnerability highly practical and dangerous in real-world scenarios where users may inadvertently visit compromised websites.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should focus on implementing strict CORS header validation and proper origin checking mechanisms. The most effective immediate fix involves configuring the Parity client to enforce a strict whitelist of trusted origins, ensuring that only explicitly authorized domains can access the JSON-RPC interface. Organizations should also consider implementing additional security layers such as authentication tokens, IP address restrictions, and network segmentation to limit access to the RPC endpoint. According to ATT&CK framework category T1190, this vulnerability represents a technique for gaining access to network services through web-based attacks, making it essential for security teams to monitor for unauthorized access attempts and implement proper network access controls. The vulnerability also highlights the importance of regularly updating software components and maintaining current security patches to prevent exploitation of known weaknesses in cryptocurrency infrastructure.