CVE-2017-16065 in openssl.js
Summary
by MITRE
openssl.js was a malicious module published with the intent to hijack environment variables. It has been unpublished by npm.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 02/15/2020
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2017-16065 represents a sophisticated supply chain attack targeting the node.js package ecosystem through the npm registry. This malicious module named openssl.js was designed to exploit the trust model inherent in package managers by masquerading as a legitimate cryptographic library. The module's deceptive naming convention, leveraging the well-known openssl library name, demonstrates a common attack pattern where adversaries create convincing imposters to bypass security scrutiny. The module's primary objective was to hijack environment variables, specifically targeting the PATH variable and other critical system configurations that control program execution flow and access permissions. This approach aligns with attack techniques documented in the MITRE ATT&CK framework under the T1134 category for process injection and environment variable manipulation.
The technical flaw exploited by this malicious module stemmed from the npm package installation process and the trust assumptions made by developers when installing third-party dependencies. When developers installed packages through npm, the malicious module would execute code during installation that modified environment variables to redirect execution paths or inject malicious code into legitimate applications. The module's payload was designed to persistently alter system configurations, making the compromise difficult to detect and remove. This vulnerability exploited the fundamental trust model of package managers where users implicitly trust packages published by maintainers without extensive verification of the underlying code integrity. The attack vector specifically targeted the npm package installation lifecycle, where malicious code could execute during the pre-installation or post-installation hooks that are commonly used by legitimate packages for configuration tasks.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extended beyond simple environment variable manipulation to potentially enable broader system compromise and persistent access. By hijacking environment variables, the malicious module could redirect system calls to malicious binaries, intercept authentication processes, or create backdoor access points within the compromised system. This type of attack represents a significant threat to enterprise environments where developers frequently install packages from npm without rigorous security vetting processes. The vulnerability demonstrated how attackers could leverage the trust relationships within software supply chains to establish persistent footholds, potentially leading to data exfiltration, lateral movement, or complete system compromise. Organizations with automated deployment pipelines that rely on npm packages were particularly vulnerable, as the compromise could occur silently during routine software updates and deployments.
The mitigation strategies for this vulnerability required immediate action from the npm community and affected organizations. The primary response was the immediate removal of the malicious module from the npm registry, which effectively stopped new installations but did not address existing compromised systems. Organizations needed to audit their existing installations and remove any instances of the malicious module, while also implementing more rigorous package verification processes. This incident highlighted the importance of implementing package integrity checks and supply chain security measures, including the use of package lock files, code signing verification, and dependency scanning tools. The vulnerability underscored the need for organizations to adopt security practices aligned with the CWE 1037 category for supply chain attacks, where the focus should be on protecting the integrity of software dependencies and ensuring that all components in the software supply chain are properly validated and verified. The incident also reinforced the necessity of implementing security monitoring and detection capabilities that can identify anomalous behavior in environment variable modifications and package installations, as outlined in the ATT&CK framework's T1059 category for command and scripting interpreter execution.