CVE-2017-17763 in SuperBeam
Summary
by MITRE
SuperBeam through 4.1.3, when using the LAN or WiFi Direct Share feature, does not use HTTPS or any integrity-protection mechanism for file transfer, which makes it easier for remote attackers to send crafted files, as demonstrated by APK injection.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 12/16/2019
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2017-17763 affects SuperBeam versions 4.1.3 and earlier, specifically within its LAN and WiFi Direct Share functionality. This represents a critical security flaw that undermines the integrity and confidentiality of file transfers conducted through the application's peer-to-peer sharing mechanisms. The vulnerability stems from the application's failure to implement proper encryption or integrity protection measures during file transmission, creating an exploitable gap in the security architecture that adversaries can leverage to compromise the system.
The technical flaw manifests in the application's communication protocol design where file transfers occur over unencrypted channels without any form of transport layer security or data integrity verification. This absence of HTTPS implementation and integrity protection mechanisms means that all data transmitted between devices remains vulnerable to interception, modification, and injection attacks. The vulnerability directly maps to CWE-319, which addresses the exposure of sensitive information through improper use of network protocols, and CWE-310, which covers cryptographic issues related to the use of weak or absent encryption. Attackers can exploit this weakness by crafting malicious files that are transmitted through the same network channels used for legitimate file sharing, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution or data manipulation.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data exposure to encompass potential system compromise and unauthorized access. When attackers can inject crafted APK files through the unsecured file transfer channels, they gain the capability to execute arbitrary code on target devices, potentially leading to full system control. This vulnerability particularly affects mobile environments where SuperBeam operates, as the WiFi Direct and LAN sharing features are commonly used for device-to-device file transfers in both personal and enterprise settings. The attack surface is significantly expanded because the vulnerability exists in the application's core sharing functionality, making it accessible to remote attackers who can potentially position themselves within the same network segment.
The implications of this vulnerability align with several tactics outlined in the MITRE ATT&CK framework, particularly those related to initial access and execution. Attackers can leverage this weakness as part of a broader attack chain where they first establish presence on the network and then use the unsecured file transfer mechanisms to deploy malicious payloads. The vulnerability also relates to defense evasion techniques since the lack of integrity checking makes it difficult for systems to detect when files have been tampered with during transfer. Organizations using SuperBeam in enterprise environments face significant risks, as this vulnerability can be exploited to bypass security controls and establish persistent access to networked devices. The risk is compounded by the fact that many users may not be aware of the security implications of using such unsecured sharing features, leading to unintentional exposure of their systems to malicious actors.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require immediate action to address the root cause of the insecure communication channels. Organizations should implement network segmentation to isolate devices using SuperBeam from critical infrastructure, deploy network monitoring tools to detect anomalous file transfer patterns, and consider disabling the LAN and WiFi Direct sharing features until proper security measures are implemented. The recommended approach involves enforcing mandatory encryption for all file transfers, implementing digital signatures for file integrity verification, and ensuring that all network communications utilize secure protocols such as HTTPS or TLS. Additionally, users should be educated about the security risks associated with unencrypted file transfers and the importance of verifying file integrity before execution. Patch management procedures should be established to ensure timely updates to SuperBeam and other applications that may be vulnerable to similar issues, while security audits should be conducted to identify and remediate other applications with similar communication protocol weaknesses.