CVE-2017-2751 in Notebook
Summary
by MITRE
A BIOS password extraction vulnerability has been reported on certain consumer notebooks with firmware F.22 and others. The BIOS password was stored in CMOS in a way that allowed it to be extracted. This applies to consumer notebooks launched in early 2014.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 03/29/2020
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2017-2751 represents a critical security flaw in the firmware implementation of certain consumer notebook computers manufactured in early 2014. This issue specifically affects systems running firmware version F.22 and similar variants where the BIOS password protection mechanism was improperly configured to store authentication credentials in the CMOS memory space. The flaw stems from inadequate cryptographic handling of sensitive authentication data within the system's firmware layer, creating a direct pathway for unauthorized extraction of administrative passwords that should have remained protected.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability resides in the CMOS memory management system where the BIOS password is stored using a predictable and reversible encryption scheme or simply stored in plain text format. This design flaw allows an attacker with physical access to the device to extract the password through direct memory inspection or by utilizing specialized tools that can read CMOS data structures. The vulnerability manifests as a weakness in the firmware's credential storage mechanism, where the security controls fail to properly encrypt or obfuscate the stored password, making it accessible to anyone with sufficient technical knowledge and physical access to the hardware. This represents a direct violation of security principles that require sensitive data to be protected through strong cryptographic mechanisms.
The operational impact of CVE-2017-2751 extends beyond simple password exposure, as it fundamentally compromises the system's initial security posture and provides attackers with unauthorized administrative access to the device. Once extracted, the BIOS password enables attackers to bypass firmware-level protections, modify system settings, disable security features, and potentially gain access to encrypted data or perform malicious firmware modifications. This vulnerability creates a persistent backdoor that remains active even after operating system reinstallation or complete system resets, as the password is stored at the firmware level rather than in the operating system. The attack surface is further expanded by the fact that this vulnerability affects consumer notebooks, which are typically less secured in physical environments and more accessible to unauthorized individuals who might exploit this weakness for various malicious purposes.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require immediate firmware updates from manufacturers, which should implement proper encryption mechanisms for storing BIOS passwords in CMOS memory. System administrators should also consider implementing additional physical security measures such as securing device access, disabling unnecessary firmware features, and conducting regular security assessments to identify affected systems. The vulnerability aligns with CWE-310, which addresses cryptographic weaknesses in password storage mechanisms, and maps to ATT&CK technique T1014, which covers rootkit creation through firmware manipulation. Organizations should also consider implementing hardware-based security features such as Trusted Platform Modules and secure boot mechanisms to provide additional layers of protection against firmware-level attacks that exploit such vulnerabilities.