CVE-2017-7405 in DIR-615info

Summary

by MITRE

On the D-Link DIR-615 before v20.12PTb04, once authenticated, this device identifies the user based on the IP address of his machine. By spoofing the IP address belonging to the victim's host, an attacker might be able to take over the administrative session without being prompted for authentication credentials. An attacker can get the victim's and router's IP addresses by simply sniffing the network traffic. Moreover, if the victim has web access enabled on his router and is accessing the web interface from a different network that is behind the NAT/Proxy, an attacker can sniff the network traffic to know the public IP address of the victim's router and take over his session as he won't be prompted for credentials.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 10/24/2019

The vulnerability described in CVE-2017-7405 affects the D-Link DIR-615 wireless router model prior to firmware version 20.12PTb04, representing a critical session management flaw that undermines the device's authentication security mechanisms. This issue stems from the router's improper session identification process, where the system relies solely on IP address verification rather than implementing robust session tokens or authentication mechanisms. The vulnerability creates a session hijacking opportunity that directly violates security principle of least privilege and proper access control enforcement. According to CWE-384, this represents a session fixation vulnerability where the system fails to properly validate session identifiers, allowing unauthorized users to assume legitimate user sessions through IP address spoofing techniques.

The technical exploitation of this vulnerability occurs through a simple yet effective IP address spoofing attack that leverages the router's weak session management implementation. When an authenticated user accesses the router's web interface, the system establishes a session tied to that user's IP address, creating a predictable session identifier. An attacker who can monitor network traffic and obtain the victim's IP address can then spoof this address to establish a new session that appears to be the legitimate user's session. This attack vector demonstrates a fundamental flaw in the router's security architecture where network layer information is incorrectly trusted as sufficient authentication evidence, violating the principle of multi-factor authentication and proper session management practices.

The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple unauthorized access to encompass complete administrative control of the affected router, potentially exposing all network configurations, user credentials, and network services. The attack requires minimal technical expertise and can be executed through passive network monitoring, making it particularly dangerous in shared network environments where attackers can easily capture traffic. This vulnerability affects the router's ability to maintain secure session boundaries and demonstrates poor implementation of network security controls, as the system fails to properly authenticate session requests beyond IP address verification. The implications include potential man-in-the-middle attacks, unauthorized network configuration changes, and complete compromise of the device's administrative functions.

The attack scenario becomes more sophisticated when considering NAT traversal situations where victims access the router's web interface from different networks, as the attacker can capture the public IP address of the victim's router through network sniffing. This capability enables attackers to conduct session hijacking attacks from remote locations, significantly expanding the attack surface and making the vulnerability more exploitable in real-world scenarios. The vulnerability also highlights the importance of proper session management in network devices, as it demonstrates how reliance on single-factor authentication mechanisms can be easily bypassed. According to ATT&CK framework domain T1566, this vulnerability enables initial access through credential harvesting and session hijacking techniques, while T1071.001 addresses the network protocol manipulation that occurs during the attack.

Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability must address both the immediate session management flaw and the broader network security posture. The primary solution involves updating the router firmware to a version that implements proper session token management and authentication mechanisms, ensuring that sessions are tied to robust authentication tokens rather than simple IP address verification. Network administrators should also implement additional security measures such as enabling strong authentication mechanisms, disabling unnecessary web access, and implementing proper network segmentation to limit the exposure of administrative interfaces. The vulnerability underscores the need for implementing proper session management practices including session timeout mechanisms, secure token generation, and multi-factor authentication to prevent similar issues in other network devices and applications.

Sources

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