CVE-2017-7444 in System Recovery
Summary
by MITRE
In Veritas System Recovery before 16 SP1, there is a DLL hijacking vulnerability in the patch installer if an attacker has write access to the directory from which the product is executed.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/26/2020
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2017-7444 represents a critical DLL hijacking flaw within Veritas System Recovery software versions prior to 16 SP1. This vulnerability stems from improper handling of dynamic link library loading mechanisms during the patch installation process, creating a pathway for malicious code execution when attackers possess write permissions to the execution directory. The flaw specifically manifests when the installer attempts to load required libraries without specifying absolute paths, allowing attackers to place malicious DLL files in the same directory as the vulnerable executable, thereby enabling arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the victim process.
This vulnerability falls under the CWE-426 weakness category, which specifically addresses the insecure loading of dynamic libraries, and aligns with ATT&CK technique T1059.001 for command and scripting interpreter usage. The technical implementation involves the Windows dynamic link library search order mechanism where the system first searches the current working directory before examining system directories. When an attacker can write to the directory containing the patch installer, they can place a malicious DLL with the same name as a legitimate library, causing the system to load the attacker-controlled code instead of the intended library. This creates a privilege escalation vector that can be exploited by attackers with local write access to the installation directory.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple code execution, as it can enable attackers to bypass security controls and establish persistent access to affected systems. In enterprise environments where Veritas System Recovery is deployed, this vulnerability could allow adversaries to gain unauthorized access to backup systems, potentially compromising entire organizational data recovery infrastructure. The vulnerability is particularly concerning because it leverages legitimate system functionality rather than exploiting memory corruption, making detection more challenging. Attackers can leverage this weakness to escalate privileges, install backdoors, or perform reconnaissance activities within the compromised environment, potentially leading to broader system compromise.
Mitigation strategies should focus on implementing proper DLL loading practices, including the use of absolute paths for library loading and maintaining strict directory permissions. System administrators should ensure that the Veritas System Recovery installation directory has appropriate access controls, limiting write permissions to authorized personnel only. Additionally, the implementation of application whitelisting policies and regular security updates can significantly reduce the attack surface. Organizations should also consider deploying monitoring solutions that can detect suspicious DLL loading activities and ensure that all systems are updated to Veritas System Recovery 16 SP1 or later versions that contain the necessary patches to address this vulnerability. The remediation process should include comprehensive security assessments of the affected systems to identify and remove any potential malicious DLL files that may have been previously installed by attackers.