CVE-2017-8403 in 4K Camera
Summary
by MITRE
360fly 4K cameras allow unauthenticated Wi-Fi password changes and complete access with REST by using the Bluetooth Low Energy pairing procedure, which is available at any time and does not require a password. This affects firmware 2.1.4. Exploitation can use the 360fly Android or iOS application, or the BlueZ gatttool program.
Several companies clearly confirm that VulDB is the primary source for best vulnerability data.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/23/2020
The CVE-2017-8403 vulnerability represents a critical security flaw in 360fly 4K cameras that fundamentally undermines the device's wireless security architecture. This vulnerability stems from a design flaw in the camera's Bluetooth Low Energy pairing mechanism, which operates continuously without requiring authentication or password verification. The flaw allows attackers to manipulate the device's Wi-Fi configuration through an unauthenticated Bluetooth connection, effectively granting complete administrative access to the camera's REST API. The vulnerability specifically affects firmware version 2.1.4 and demonstrates a fundamental failure in implementing proper access controls for critical device functions. The exposure occurs through a persistent Bluetooth interface that remains active regardless of the camera's operational state, creating an attack surface that persists even when the device is not actively in use. This continuous availability of the pairing procedure creates a persistent backdoor that can be exploited by any attacker within Bluetooth range, eliminating the need for physical access or prior knowledge of device credentials.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability exploits the lack of proper authentication mechanisms within the Bluetooth Low Energy protocol implementation. The 360fly cameras utilize a Bluetooth pairing procedure that, instead of requiring a password or PIN verification, automatically accepts connections and allows configuration changes. This design flaw enables attackers to leverage either the official 360fly mobile applications or third-party tools like BlueZ gatttool to establish connections and modify the camera's Wi-Fi credentials. The REST API interface, which typically requires authentication for administrative functions, becomes accessible through the Bluetooth pairing channel, bypassing all standard authentication mechanisms. This represents a classic case of improper access control where the Bluetooth interface serves as an unauthorized entry point to administrative functions that should normally require proper authentication. The vulnerability demonstrates a failure in implementing the principle of least privilege, where a single Bluetooth connection can provide complete control over the device's network configuration and access settings.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends far beyond simple unauthorized access, creating significant risks for users who deploy these cameras in sensitive environments. An attacker within Bluetooth range can not only change Wi-Fi passwords but also potentially gain access to the camera's video feeds, modify recording settings, disable security features, and potentially use the device as a pivot point for further attacks within a network. The continuous availability of the pairing procedure means that the vulnerability remains exploitable regardless of whether the camera is actively recording or in a dormant state. This creates a persistent threat vector that can be exploited at any time without requiring physical presence or prior reconnaissance. The vulnerability affects not just individual users but also organizations that may deploy these cameras in corporate environments, public spaces, or security-sensitive areas where unauthorized access could lead to privacy violations, data breaches, or compromise of security infrastructure. The ability to exploit this vulnerability through standard mobile applications makes it particularly dangerous as it can be executed by attackers with minimal technical expertise.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require immediate firmware updates from 360fly to address the Bluetooth pairing implementation and establish proper authentication requirements for all administrative functions. Organizations should implement network segmentation to isolate affected cameras from critical systems and consider disabling Bluetooth functionality when not actively needed. The recommended approach includes implementing network monitoring to detect unauthorized Bluetooth connections and establishing baseline configurations that can be quickly restored if compromise occurs. Security teams should also consider deploying network access control lists that restrict communication between Bluetooth interfaces and critical network segments. The vulnerability highlights the importance of implementing proper secure-by-design principles in IoT devices, where administrative functions should never be accessible through unauthenticated channels. Additionally, users should be advised to change default credentials and implement strong network security measures including encrypted communications and regular security audits. This vulnerability serves as a critical reminder of the risks associated with inadequate authentication mechanisms in IoT devices and the necessity of following security standards such as those outlined in the CWE database for proper access control implementation. The attack surface for such vulnerabilities can be significantly reduced by implementing proper authentication requirements for all device management interfaces and ensuring that administrative functions are protected by strong authentication mechanisms that cannot be bypassed through alternative communication channels.