CVE-2017-9134 in Client Radios
Summary
by MITRE
An information-leakage issue was discovered on Mimosa Client Radios before 2.2.3 and Mimosa Backhaul Radios before 2.2.3. There is a page in the web interface that will show you the device's serial number, regardless of whether or not you have logged in. This information-leakage issue is relevant because there is another page (accessible without any authentication) that allows you to remotely factory reset the device simply by entering the serial number.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/01/2020
The vulnerability described in CVE-2017-9134 represents a critical information disclosure weakness affecting Mimosa Client Radios and Mimosa Backhaul Radios devices running firmware versions prior to 2.2.3. This flaw stems from inadequate authentication controls within the web interface, allowing unauthorized users to access sensitive device information without proper credentials. The vulnerability specifically manifests through a web page that exposes the device's serial number to any visitor, regardless of their authentication status, creating an unintended information disclosure channel that violates fundamental security principles of access control and confidentiality.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability demonstrates a classic lack of proper authorization checks within the web application layer of these networking devices. The serial number information is exposed through a web interface page that bypasses normal authentication mechanisms, which aligns with CWE-284 Access Control Issues and specifically CWE-200 Information Exposure. This design flaw allows any remote attacker to obtain the serial number simply by navigating to the appropriate URL, without requiring any login credentials or authentication tokens. The exposure of the serial number represents a significant compromise of device confidentiality, as this information serves as a unique identifier that can be used for various malicious activities including device tracking, inventory management, and targeted attacks.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple information disclosure, as it creates a direct pathway for device compromise through the subsequent exploitation of another unauthenticated web page. The combination of these two vulnerabilities creates a dangerous attack vector where an attacker can first obtain the device serial number through the information disclosure issue, then use this information to perform a remote factory reset of the device through the second unauthenticated page. This scenario represents a complete loss of device control and configuration, effectively allowing an attacker to restore the device to its factory default state without any authorization. The vulnerability enables a form of remote device destruction or disruption that can severely impact network operations and security posture, particularly in environments where these devices are deployed for critical communications infrastructure.
This vulnerability aligns with several ATT&CK framework techniques including T1082 System Information Discovery and T1490 Inhibit System Recovery, demonstrating how information disclosure can lead to more severe operational impacts. The flaw represents a failure in the principle of least privilege, where sensitive device information is accessible to all users without proper authentication. Organizations using these devices face significant risk of unauthorized access and potential network disruption, as the serial number information can be used in conjunction with other attack vectors to compromise device integrity and availability. The vulnerability also highlights the importance of proper web application security controls and the need for comprehensive authentication mechanisms across all web interface components. Network administrators should immediately implement firmware updates to version 2.2.3 or later to address this vulnerability, as the exposure of device serial numbers creates a foundation for more sophisticated attacks and operational disruptions.
The security implications of this vulnerability extend to broader network security practices, as device serial numbers can be used to identify specific device models, firmware versions, and potentially even manufacturing details that could be exploited in targeted attacks. This information leakage creates opportunities for attackers to tailor their exploitation strategies based on known vulnerabilities specific to certain device models or firmware versions, making the impact of this vulnerability more severe than initially apparent. The presence of multiple unauthenticated web pages on the same device interface demonstrates poor security architecture design and highlights the need for comprehensive security testing of network device web interfaces. Organizations should conduct thorough security assessments of their network infrastructure to identify similar vulnerabilities and implement proper access controls across all administrative interfaces to prevent unauthorized access and information disclosure incidents.