CVE-2017-9649 in DMC 3000 Transmitter Module
Summary
by MITRE
A Use of Hard-Coded Cryptographic Key issue was discovered in Mirion Technologies DMC 3000 Transmitter Module, iPam Transmitter f/DMC 2000, RDS-31 iTX and variants (including RSD31-AM Package), DRM-1/2 and variants (including Solar PWR Package), DRM and RDS Based Boundary Monitors, External Transmitters, Telepole II, and MESH Repeater (Telemetry Enabled Devices). An unchangeable, factory-set key is included in the 900 MHz transmitter firmware.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 01/13/2021
The vulnerability described in CVE-2017-9649 represents a critical security flaw in several telemetry and monitoring devices manufactured by Mirion Technologies. These devices operate within the 900 MHz frequency band and are deployed for radiation monitoring and boundary surveillance applications. The affected products include DMC 3000 Transmitter Module, iPam Transmitter f/DMC 2000, RDS-31 iTX and variants, DRM-1/2 and variants, and various boundary monitoring systems. The flaw stems from the inclusion of a hard-coded cryptographic key within the firmware of these telemetry-enabled devices, which cannot be modified or replaced by end users or system administrators. This design decision fundamentally compromises the security posture of the entire device ecosystem.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability aligns with CWE-320, which specifically addresses the use of hard-coded cryptographic keys in software systems. The flaw manifests as an insecure cryptographic implementation where the same encryption key is embedded across all devices of the affected product lines, creating a single point of failure for the entire deployment. This hard-coded key serves as the foundation for all cryptographic operations including data encryption, authentication, and integrity verification within the device communications. Since the key is permanently embedded in the firmware and cannot be updated or changed, any individual device can be compromised by an attacker who gains access to the key through reverse engineering or other means. The vulnerability is particularly concerning because these devices are typically deployed in sensitive environments where radiation monitoring is critical, and their compromise could lead to unauthorized access to monitoring data or system control.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends far beyond simple cryptographic weakness, as it fundamentally undermines the security model of the entire monitoring infrastructure. Attackers who obtain the hard-coded key can potentially decrypt all communications between these devices and their central monitoring systems, impersonate legitimate devices, or inject malicious data into the monitoring network. This creates a scenario where unauthorized parties could manipulate radiation readings, disable security alerts, or gain complete control over the monitoring network. The vulnerability is especially dangerous in industrial and nuclear environments where these devices are often deployed, as it could lead to safety violations, regulatory compliance issues, or even security breaches that compromise public safety. The fact that these devices operate in telemetry mode means that they continuously transmit data, making the exposure window for any attacker potentially unlimited.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability are severely limited due to the immutable nature of the hard-coded key within the firmware. Organizations should implement network segmentation to isolate these devices from critical systems, deploy network monitoring to detect anomalous communications patterns, and consider physical security measures to prevent unauthorized access to the devices themselves. The most effective long-term solution requires manufacturers to provide firmware updates or replacement hardware that addresses the cryptographic key issue, though this may not be feasible for all deployed units. Security teams should also implement continuous monitoring of device communications and establish incident response procedures specifically designed for this type of vulnerability. From an att&ck perspective, this vulnerability maps to techniques involving credential access and defense evasion, as attackers could use the compromised key to maintain persistent access to monitoring systems while avoiding detection through legitimate device communications. Organizations should also consider the broader implications for supply chain security and implement additional verification measures for all telemetry-enabled devices in their environments.