CVE-2018-10769 in SmartMesh
Summary
by MITRE
The transferProxy and approveProxy functions of a smart contract implementation for SmartMesh (SMT), an Ethereum ERC20 token, allow attackers to accomplish an unauthorized transfer of digital assets because replay attacks can occur with the same-named functions (with the same signatures) in other tokens: First (FST), GG Token (GG), M2C Mesh Network (MTC), M2C Mesh Network (mesh), and UG Token (UGT).
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 03/14/2020
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2018-10769 affects the SmartMesh (SMT) ERC20 token implementation on the Ethereum blockchain, representing a critical security flaw that stems from inadequate transaction validation mechanisms within the smart contract's proxy functions. This issue specifically impacts the transferProxy and approveProxy functions, which serve as intermediaries for asset transfers and approval operations respectively. The flaw creates a scenario where attackers can exploit replay attacks to manipulate transactions across multiple token implementations that share identical function signatures, thereby enabling unauthorized asset transfers that should remain restricted to legitimate users.
The technical root cause of this vulnerability lies in the lack of proper nonce validation and transaction replay protection mechanisms within the smart contract's proxy function implementations. When these functions execute with identical signatures across different token contracts, they create a dangerous overlap where transaction data can be replayed across multiple implementations without proper validation. This vulnerability aligns with CWE-327, which addresses broken cryptographic implementations, and more specifically with CWE-347, focusing on improper certificate validation. The flaw operates at the contract level where the absence of unique transaction identifiers or proper replay detection mechanisms allows malicious actors to reuse valid transaction data across different token contracts, effectively bypassing the intended security controls.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond the immediate SmartMesh token implementation to affect an entire ecosystem of related tokens that share identical function signatures. Attackers can exploit this weakness to execute unauthorized transfers across FST, GG, MTC, mesh, and UGT tokens, creating a cascading security risk that multiplies the potential damage from a single exploitation point. This creates a scenario where the compromise of one token implementation can lead to unauthorized asset transfers across multiple related tokens, fundamentally undermining the security model of the entire token ecosystem. The vulnerability enables attackers to perform unauthorized transactions with minimal effort, as the same transaction data can be replayed across multiple contracts without requiring additional authentication or validation steps.
The attack vector for this vulnerability follows a well-defined pattern where an attacker identifies the shared function signatures across multiple token implementations and then crafts transaction data that can be replayed across these contracts. This approach leverages the fundamental design flaw in the proxy function implementations, where the lack of proper transaction validation allows the same transaction to be executed successfully on multiple contracts. The attack aligns with ATT&CK technique T1548.001, which covers abuse of cloud compute services, and T1078, which addresses valid accounts usage, as the attacker can exploit legitimate transaction pathways to move assets across different token implementations.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require immediate implementation of robust nonce validation mechanisms within the proxy functions, ensuring that each transaction can only be executed once across any given token implementation. Smart contract developers should implement transaction replay protection by incorporating unique identifiers or timestamps into transaction processing, preventing the reuse of valid transaction data across multiple contracts. The recommended approach involves updating the smart contract code to include proper transaction validation checks that ensure each transaction is unique and cannot be replayed across different token implementations. Additionally, implementing proper access controls and transaction verification mechanisms will prevent unauthorized actors from exploiting the shared function signatures that create this vulnerability. Organizations should also consider conducting comprehensive audits of their smart contract implementations to identify similar patterns that could create cross-contract exploitation opportunities, ensuring that all proxy functions include proper validation mechanisms to prevent replay attacks.