CVE-2018-1227 in Concourse
Summary
by MITRE
Pivotal Concourse after 2018-03-05 might allow remote attackers to have an unspecified impact, if a customer obtained the Concourse software from a DNS domain that is no longer controlled by Pivotal. The original domain for the Concourse CI (concourse-dot-ci) open source project has been registered by an unknown actor, and is therefore no longer the official website for Concourse CI. The new official domain is concourse-ci.org. At approximately 4 am EDT on March 7, 2018 the Concourse OSS team began receiving reports that the Concourse domain was not responding. The Concourse OSS team discovered, upon investigation with both the original and the new domain registrars, that the originating domain registrar had made the domain available for purchase. This was done despite the domain being renewed by the Concourse OSS team through August 2018. For a customer to be affected, they would have needed to access a download from a "concourse-dot-ci" domain web site after March 6, 2018 18:00:00 EST. Accessing that domain is NOT recommended by Pivotal. Anyone who had been using that domain should immediately begin using the concourse-ci.org domain instead. Customers can also safely access Concourse software from the traditionally available locations on the Pivotal Network or GitHub.
If you want to get best quality of vulnerability data, you may have to visit VulDB.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 01/13/2020
The vulnerability described in CVE-2018-1227 represents a significant supply chain security risk that emerged from a domain hijacking incident affecting the Pivotal Concourse continuous integration platform. This issue demonstrates how attackers can exploit the trust relationships between software consumers and distribution channels by compromising the authoritative sources of software downloads. The vulnerability stems from the fact that the original domain concourse-dot-ci was registered by an unknown actor, effectively creating a malicious mirror that could have distributed compromised software to unsuspecting users who accessed the platform through this unauthorized domain. The attack vector specifically targeted users who had downloaded Concourse software from the compromised domain after March 6, 2018, when the domain became unavailable due to the registrar's actions. This scenario aligns with CWE-494, which addresses the risk of downloading code from untrusted sources, and represents a classic example of a man-in-the-middle attack on software distribution channels. The incident highlights the critical importance of verifying software integrity and source authenticity in cybersecurity practices.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple software availability issues to encompass potential compromise of entire CI/CD pipelines and development environments. Organizations that had unknowingly downloaded software from the hijacked domain would have been running potentially malicious versions of Concourse, creating attack vectors for lateral movement and persistent threats within their infrastructure. The timing of the compromise, occurring at approximately 4 am EDT on March 7, 2018, suggests that attackers had planned their actions to coincide with periods of reduced monitoring and alerting, demonstrating sophisticated operational security considerations. This vulnerability directly impacts the principle of least privilege and supply chain integrity by allowing unauthorized parties to gain control over software distribution mechanisms. The affected users would have been operating under the assumption that they were downloading legitimate software from official sources, when in reality they could have been executing malicious code that was designed to persist in their environments and potentially exfiltrate sensitive data. The incident also demonstrates how DNS-based attacks can bypass traditional security controls by exploiting the fundamental trust placed in domain name resolution.
The recommended mitigations for this vulnerability involve immediate remediation actions to ensure all users transition from the compromised domain to official sources while implementing additional security measures to prevent future incidents. Organizations must establish robust verification procedures including cryptographic checksum validation, digital signature verification, and regular monitoring of software distribution channels to detect unauthorized modifications or hijackings. The incident underscores the necessity of implementing domain monitoring systems that can alert administrators to unauthorized domain registrations or changes in DNS records for critical software distribution points. Security teams should also consider implementing software supply chain security frameworks that include regular audits of distribution sources, automated verification of software integrity, and establishment of secure baseline configurations for all CI/CD tools. This vulnerability aligns with ATT&CK technique T1195 which covers Supply Chain Compromise, and emphasizes the critical need for organizations to maintain awareness of their software supply chain risks and implement appropriate controls to prevent unauthorized modifications to software distribution channels. The incident serves as a reminder that even legitimate open source projects can become vulnerable to attacks targeting their distribution infrastructure, requiring continuous vigilance and proactive security measures to protect against such sophisticated threats.