CVE-2018-1279 in RabbitMQ
Summary
by MITRE
Pivotal RabbitMQ for PCF, all versions, uses a deterministically generated cookie that is shared between all machines when configured in a multi-tenant cluster. A remote attacker who can gain information about the network topology can guess this cookie and, if they have access to the right ports on any server in the MQ cluster can use this cookie to gain full control over the entire cluster.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 06/13/2023
The vulnerability described in CVE-2018-1279 represents a critical security flaw in Pivotal RabbitMQ for PCF deployments where the system employs a deterministically generated cookie value across all machines within a multi-tenant cluster configuration. This weakness stems from the predictable nature of the cookie generation algorithm, which creates identical authentication tokens for all nodes in the cluster. The vulnerability operates under the principle that when multiple systems share the same cryptographic material, particularly in distributed environments, it creates a single point of failure that can be exploited by adversaries with minimal information about the target network topology. The deterministic generation process violates fundamental security principles that require unique, unpredictable authentication tokens for each system component to prevent cross-system compromise scenarios.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability relies on the predictable nature of the cookie generation mechanism, which typically involves using static parameters or insufficient entropy sources during the cryptographic token creation process. This flaw allows attackers to perform cookie guessing attacks where they can systematically attempt to authenticate to cluster nodes using the shared cookie value. The attack requires only basic network reconnaissance to understand the cluster topology and identify accessible ports, making it particularly dangerous in environments where network visibility is limited. The vulnerability specifically affects all versions of Pivotal RabbitMQ for PCF, indicating a widespread issue that impacts numerous deployments and installations. This deterministic approach to cookie generation directly correlates with CWE-327, which addresses the use of insecure cryptographic algorithms and predictable random number generation in security-critical applications.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and potentially catastrophic for organizations using affected RabbitMQ deployments, as it provides attackers with complete administrative control over the entire cluster. Once an attacker successfully guesses the shared cookie, they can perform any administrative function within the cluster including adding or removing nodes, modifying routing configurations, accessing message queues, and potentially exfiltrating sensitive data. The multi-tenant nature of the affected systems amplifies the risk as a compromise of one tenant's access can potentially extend to all other tenants within the same cluster. This scenario creates a significant escalation path for attackers who can leverage their initial foothold to move laterally across the cluster and potentially access data belonging to multiple customers or departments. The attack vector requires minimal sophistication and can be automated, making it particularly dangerous for high-value targets.
Organizations should implement immediate mitigations including the generation of unique, cryptographically secure cookies for each cluster node and ensuring proper network segmentation to restrict access to cluster management ports. The implementation of network-level controls such as firewall rules that limit access to cluster ports to authorized administrative networks is essential. Additionally, organizations should consider implementing network monitoring solutions to detect unusual authentication patterns and cookie guessing attempts. The remediation process requires careful coordination with cluster administrators to ensure that cookie regeneration does not disrupt ongoing services while maintaining the security posture. Security teams should also conduct thorough vulnerability assessments to identify any other instances of deterministic credential generation within their RabbitMQ deployments and related systems. The solution aligns with ATT&CK technique T1078 which addresses legitimate credentials usage and privilege escalation through the exploitation of predictable authentication mechanisms, emphasizing the importance of unique credential generation in multi-tenant environments.