CVE-2018-15754 in Cloud Foundry UAA
Summary
by MITRE
Cloud Foundry UAA, all versions in v60.x, v61.x, v62.x, v63.x, and v64.x contain an authorization logic error. In environments with multiple identity providers that contain accounts across identity providers with the same username, a remote authenticated user with access to one of these accounts may be able to obtain a token for an account of the same username in the other identity provider.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 06/18/2023
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2018-15754 affects Cloud Foundry User Account and Authentication (UAA) service versions 60.x through 64.x, representing a critical authorization logic flaw that undermines the security boundaries between multiple identity providers within the same environment. This issue stems from insufficient account uniqueness validation when users authenticate across different identity providers that share common usernames, creating a fundamental weakness in the authentication system's ability to maintain proper access control. The flaw specifically impacts multi-identity provider deployments where the same username exists in different identity stores, allowing for cross-provider account impersonation.
The technical root cause of this vulnerability lies in the UAA's authorization logic failing to properly distinguish between accounts with identical usernames across different identity providers during token issuance processes. When a user authenticates through one identity provider, the system does not adequately verify that the account belongs to the intended identity provider, enabling an authenticated user to potentially obtain valid authentication tokens for accounts with matching usernames in other identity providers. This represents a classic case of insufficient authentication context validation and improper account identification mechanisms that violate fundamental security principles.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe as it allows remote authenticated attackers to escalate privileges and gain unauthorized access to accounts belonging to other identity providers within the same Cloud Foundry environment. An attacker who compromises an account in one identity provider can potentially impersonate users in other identity providers, leading to unauthorized data access, privilege escalation, and potential system compromise. This vulnerability directly undermines the principle of least privilege and can result in significant data breaches, unauthorized administrative access, and complete compromise of user accounts across multiple identity domains.
Organizations utilizing Cloud Foundry UAA versions affected by CVE-2018-15754 should immediately implement mitigations including upgrading to patched versions of the UAA service, implementing stricter account uniqueness policies across identity providers, and configuring proper identity provider isolation mechanisms. The vulnerability aligns with CWE-287 (Improper Authentication) and represents a violation of the principle of authentication context integrity. Security teams should also consider implementing additional monitoring for unusual authentication patterns and cross-provider account access attempts. According to ATT&CK framework, this vulnerability maps to T1078 (Valid Accounts) and T1531 (Account Access Removal) as attackers can leverage legitimate credentials to access unauthorized accounts, potentially leading to further lateral movement within the environment.
The vulnerability demonstrates a critical flaw in identity management systems where proper account namespace separation is not maintained, allowing for account confusion and unauthorized access. Organizations should conduct comprehensive audits of their identity provider configurations to ensure that username uniqueness is properly enforced across all identity domains. This includes implementing proper account mapping and validation mechanisms that prevent the system from confusing accounts with identical names across different identity providers. The remediation process should also include thorough testing of authentication flows to ensure that token issuance properly validates account identity and provider context, preventing the cross-provider impersonation scenario that this vulnerability enables.