CVE-2018-19616 in PowerMonitor 1000
Summary
by MITRE
An issue was discovered in Rockwell Automation Allen-Bradley PowerMonitor 1000. An unauthenticated user can add/edit/remove administrators because access control is implemented on the client side via a disabled attribute for a BUTTON element.
If you want to get best quality of vulnerability data, you may have to visit VulDB.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/03/2024
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2018-19616 represents a critical access control flaw within Rockwell Automation Allen-Bradley PowerMonitor 1000 industrial control devices. This issue stems from a fundamental security misconfiguration that places the responsibility for access control entirely on the client-side of the application interface. The vulnerability specifically manifests through the manipulation of HTML button elements where administrative privileges are controlled via a disabled attribute that can be easily bypassed by malicious actors. The PowerMonitor 1000 is widely deployed in industrial environments for power monitoring and management, making this vulnerability particularly concerning due to its potential impact on critical infrastructure operations.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability lies in the client-side validation approach where the system relies on front-end controls to enforce administrative access restrictions. When a user interacts with the web interface, the application uses HTML attributes to disable administrative buttons for non-privileged users. However, this approach provides no actual security boundary since the disabled attribute can be easily modified through browser developer tools or custom HTTP requests. This client-side enforcement mechanism violates fundamental security principles and creates a path for unauthorized privilege escalation. The vulnerability is classified under CWE-668 - "Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere" and aligns with ATT&CK technique T1078.101 - "Valid Accounts: Default Accounts" as it allows unauthorized access to administrative functions that should be restricted to authenticated administrators only.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple privilege escalation, as it enables unauthorized users to completely compromise the administrative functions of the PowerMonitor 1000 device. An unauthenticated attacker can manipulate the web interface to add new administrators, modify existing administrative accounts, or remove legitimate administrators from the system. This level of control allows for persistent access to the device and potentially broader network infiltration, especially in industrial environments where these devices often serve as entry points to larger control systems. The vulnerability is particularly dangerous in operational technology environments where system availability and integrity are paramount, as it could enable attackers to disrupt power monitoring operations, modify critical data, or establish backdoors for future access. The lack of authentication requirements for administrative functions creates an immediate risk to industrial control system security.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability must address both the immediate exposure and the underlying architectural flaw in the device's access control implementation. Organizations should implement network segmentation to isolate these devices from general network access, deploy network access controls to restrict communication to authorized endpoints, and apply the latest firmware updates from Rockwell Automation if available. The most effective long-term solution requires the implementation of server-side access control validation that cannot be bypassed through client-side manipulation. Security teams should also conduct regular vulnerability assessments of industrial control systems to identify similar client-side validation issues and implement proper authentication and authorization mechanisms. Network monitoring should be enhanced to detect unusual administrative activities that might indicate exploitation of this vulnerability, and incident response procedures should be updated to address potential compromise of industrial control devices through client-side access control bypasses.